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A PRIVATE ORDERING SOLUTION TO
BLOCKHOLDER DISCLOSURE
JOSHUA Mrvs'
ABSTRACT
The recent debate over reforming the Securities Exchange Act section
13(d) ten-day filing window demonstrates the importance of balancing
the costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure. While hedge
fund activism may create shareholder value, short-termism is a very
real problem for firms today. Rather than a rigid mandatory rule, the
duration of the blockholder disclosure window should be set through a
shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws that empowers
shareholders to set an optimal maximum length for each firm. To in-
ternalize the economic and moral costs to society of permitting trading
on asymmetric information, the SEC should impose a filing fee on
blockholders utilizing the delayed disclosure window and use the pro-
ceeds to compensate investors who sold shares while a blockholder
engaged in a stealth accumulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The latest round in the corporate governance tug-of-war between
management and activist shareholders is the controversy over re-
forming the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section 13(d) filing win-
dow.2 In fall 2010, activist hedge funds exploited the ten-day window
to acquire 26.7% of J.C. Penney and 10.9% of Fortune Brands.3 By
engaging in massive purchases between crossing the 5% threshold and
the required disclosure ten days later, these hedge funds stealthily ac-
cumulated shares at a discount of nearly $230 million from the post-
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012).
3. Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-
624.pdf.
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disclosure market price.' More recently, in October 2012, Carl Ichan
exploited the ten-day window to stealthily acquire 9.98% of Netflix,
yielding $52 million in potential profit on the stake acquired during
the filing window alone.
In a recent petition submitted to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC"), the law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
("Wachtell Lipton") requested that the SEC exercise its rulemaking
powers under the Dodd-Frank Act and shorten the window for filing a
notice of beneficial ownership to one day.6 Wachtell Lipton argued
that examples such as J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands demonstrate
the potential for hedge funds to exploit the ten-day window and
stealthily accumulate massive blocks of ownership.' Such stealth ac-
cumulations deprive those who sold shares during the filing window of
the premium they could have received upon disclosure of the hedge
fund's stake.
In response to Wachtell Lipton's proposal, law professors Lucian A.
Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson articulated economic justifications for
the ten-day window.8 Bebchuk and Jackson argued that announce-
ments of hedge fund activism correlates with higher share prices, sug-
gesting that it is beneficial for target firms.' However, because hedge
funds do not acquire a controlling stake, they cannot capture the en-
tire benefits of intervention."o Bebchuk and Jackson claimed that ena-
bling activist shareholders to buy shares at a discount during the ten-
day window is essential compensation for the beneficial intervention
they bring to target firms." In response, Wachtell Lipton asserted
that economic analysis does not justify undermining the purpose of
the Williams Act.1 2
This Article advocates a balanced approach to this debate and a
novel proposal for regulatory reform. Securities regulation should
neither solely promote the historical goals of the 1960s nor consider
only the benefits of hedge fund activism. If delayed blockholder dis-
closure functions as compensation for hedge fund activism, determin-
4. See discussion infra Section II.A.
5. See id.
6. Wachtell, et al., supra note 2, at 5.
7. Id. at 6-7.
8. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson Jr., The Law and Economics of
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 39 (2012).
9. Id. at 47-48.
10. Id. at 49.
11. Id. at 50.
12. Adam 0. Emmerich, Theodore N. Mirvis, Eric S. Robinson & William Savitt, Fair Mar-
kets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure,
and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power (Columbia Law School Working Paper No. 428,
Aug. 27, 2012), 3 HARV. Bus. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2138945.
2013] 205
3
Mitts: A Private Ordering Solution to Blockholder Disclosure
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2013
206 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:203
ing the optimal length of the disclosure window necessitates
considering the costs and benefits of hedge fund activism-not solely
one or the other.
The benefits are well-known. As Bebchuk, Jackson, and a growing
number of empirical finance studies demonstrate, hedge funds are
particularly effective at mitigating agency costs and increasing share-
holder value. 1 3 They are free from the regulatory restraints and struc-
tural limitations of traditional institutional investors like mutual funds
and have strong incentives to obtain outstanding objective returns. 14
On the other hand, hedge funds are preoccupied with short-term
results. Two scholars explained it well: "Hedge funds come close to
being the archetypal short-term investor. For some funds, holding
shares for a full day represents a 'long-term' investment."" It is hard
to believe that managers ignore the pressure from short-term inves-
tors simply because the efficient market hypothesis says they should.' 6
But there is no need to resort to intuition: numerous empirical studies
in the management and accounting disciplines have shown that short-
termism is a problem in corporate America." Even if finance theory
says they should not, managers feel the pressure of short-term earn-
ings. It is hard to believe that hedge funds' demands for immediate
results will have no effect on the long-term profitability of target
firms.
Delayed blockholder disclosure also imposes a cost on society.
Hedge funds stealthily buying shares during the ten-day window are
trading on asymmetric information, and information asymmetries
harm everyone in the market by reducing liquidity and increasing bid-
ask spreads."s These stealth accumulations are not doctrinally insider
trading, but their effects are quite similar. In addition to the chilling
effect caused by playing a losing game with the deck stacked against
unknowing retail investors, trading on asymmetric information is fun-
damentally unfair. It deprives market participants of autonomy by ex-
ploiting the non-disclosure of material facts regarding the share
accumulation by an activist investor. Mere participation in a market
13. See Bebchuk & Jackson Jr., supra note 7, at 47-48.
14. Id.
15. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corpo-
rate Control, 155 U. PA. L. Ruv. 1021, 1083 (2007).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin
of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 443, 469-70 (2001) (citing Laura N.
Beny, A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Agency and Market Theories of Insider Trad-
ing (1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Kimberly D. Krawiec); Utpal Bhattacharya &
Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with Kimberly D. Krawiec)).
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that legally permits trading on asymmetric information does not imply
a subjective waiver of the moral entitlement to a fully informed deci-
sion. In short, hedge funds profit from inducing others to trade on a
deceptive premise regarding the status quo when they actually intend
to upend it-and that imposes a moral cost on society.
To balance the costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure,
this Article proposes a private ordering solution akin to the approach
taken for proxy access under Rule 14a-8 19 . It may be economically
efficient for certain firms to permit some delay. Rather than imposing
a rigid mandatory rule, the SEC should let shareholders make this
decision through a shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws.
Allowing each firm to decide how long after acquiring a 5% stake
blockholders can trade before mandating disclosure would empower
shareholders to incentivize the level of hedge fund activism that would
maximize the value of their shares.
Regulators, on the other hand, should focus on the price society
pays when blockholders engage in stealth accumulations and profit by
trading on asymmetric information. This Article proposes imposing a
filing fee to induce the socially optimal disclosure duration for each
firm. Under this proposal, hedge funds filing schedule 13D 20 disclo-
sures after passing the 5% threshold would pay a fee based on an
approximation of the cost this delay imposes on society. Like a car-
bon tax on pollution-emitting factories, a delayed disclosure fee forces
hedge funds to internalize the social cost of stealth accumulations and
tacit deception of trading counterparties.
The proceeds of this delayed disclosure fee should be used to estab-
lish a compensation fund to ameliorate the injury to shareholders who
sold during the delayed disclosure window. While this fund would not
make injured investors perfectly whole, it would go a long way to-
wards offsetting the exploitation of information asymmetries permit-
ted by the private ordering system. The combination of empowering
shareholders to determine the length of the disclosure window, impos-
ing a filing fee on stealth accumulations, and compensating victims
would bring society the benefits of hedge fund activism while minimiz-
ing collateral consequences to the extent possible.
Part II of this Article presents an overview of delayed blockholder
disclosure under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Part III discusses the costs and benefits of hedge fund activism, the
primary justification for permitting delayed blockholder disclosure.
Part IV presents this Article's private ordering solution and the filing
fee and compensation proposals. Part V concludes this Article.
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2012).
2013] 207
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II. DELAYED BLOCKHOLDER DISCLOSURE UNDER SECTION 13(D)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
This Part presents an overview of section 13(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which requires disclosing the acquisition of
beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a class of reporting com-
pany's stock. It discusses the recent exploitation of this window by
two hedge funds and the immense profit they obtained. In addition,
this Part summarizes the legislative history of the ten-day disclosure
window and the Dodd-Frank provision that grants the SEC the au-
thority to shorten the disclosure window. It concludes by describing
the academic and policy debate over this issue.
A. Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Stealth
Acquisitions During the Ten-Day Window
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
provides:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial
ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant
to section 781 . . . or otherwise becomes or is deemed to become a
beneficial owner of any of the foregoing upon the purchase or sale of a
security-based swap that the Commission may define by rule, and is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum
of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition or within such
shorter time as the Commission may establish by rule, file with the
Commission, a statement containing . . . the following information
21
The statute defines a series of required disclosure items, including
identifying information regarding the beneficial owner;22 the "source
and amount of the funds" for the purchase;23 the purpose of the acqui-
sition to "acquire control," "liquidate," or perform other "major
change" to the "business or corporate structure" of the issuer;24 and
"the number of shares ... beneficially owned." 25 The SEC has imple-
mented this statute in Regulation 13D of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, which provides for filing the beneficial ownership disclosure
in Schedules 13D and 13G and sets forth the technical requirements
for filing.26
Crucially, section 13(d) does not require filing the disclosure state-
ment until ten days after the acquisition of beneficial ownership of
21. Id.
22. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(A).
23. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(B).
24. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(C).
25. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(D).
26. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to -102 (2012).
6
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 [2013], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol35/iss2/4
A PRIVATE ORDERING SOLUTION
more than 5% of the shares of any class.27 This permits investors to
acquire a block of shares substantially greater than 5% prior to the
expiration of the ten-day window. As noted in a recent petition to the
SEC by the law firm Wachtell Lipton, the recent examples of hedge
fund acquisitions of J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands stock dramati-
cally illustrate this phenomenon. 28 Two activist hedge funds-Per-
shing Square Capital Management and Vornado Realty Trust 29
acquired 26.7% ownership of J.C. Penney by exploiting the ten-day
window. 0 Prior to crossing the 5% threshold, Pershing Square held
4.9% of J.C. Penney.31 During the window, Pershing and Vornado
made a series of rapid purchases to reach the 26.7% level.3 2 Similarly,
Pershing Square went from under 5% to over 10% ownership in For-
tune Brands during the delayed disclosure window.3 3
The following graphs of the share prices of J.C. Penney and Fortune
Brands during this time period vividly illustrate these stealth acquisi-
tions and profit potential.
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2012).
28. See Wachtell, et al., supra note 2.
29. While Vornado Realty Trust is technically a real estate investment trust, it functions as
an activist hedge fund. See Brad Thomas, Vornado Realty Trust: Simply A Hedge Fund In A
REIT Wrapper, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 15, 2012, 6:42 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/
923481-vornado-realty-trust-simply-a-hedge-fund-in-a-reit-wrapper.
30. Wachtell, et al., supra note 2, at 6.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Maxwell Murphy, Deal Journal, How Bill Ackman Stalked J.C. Penney,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2010, at C3, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/10/08/how-bill-ack-
man-stalked-jc-penney/?blogid=6&post id=27627; Joann S. Lublin & Karen Talley, Big Shop-
pers Bag 26% ofJ.C Penney, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2010, at B3, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704657304575539880781136228.html).
33. Id.
2013] 209
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Data Source: Yahoo! Finance. Date Range: 9/20/2010 - 10/20/
20 10.40
Figure 2 shows the closing price of Fortune Brands Inc. prior to, dur-
ing, and following the ten-day window and section 13(d) blockholder
disclosure."* The announcement occurred after the close of trading on
October 8, 2010, as indicated by the dark-colored diamond on that
day.4 However, Pershing Square did not pass the 5% threshold until
October 4, 2010, as indicated by the light-colored diamond .43 None-
theless, the chart shows that Pershing Square was able to acquire the
remainder of its stake at a substantial discount from October 4 - 7,
2010, as the share price remained well below its post-disclosure level
during this period.44
The date range for these charts highlights important aspects of
Wachtell Lipton's proposal to reform the blockholder disclosure win-
39. Following Bill Ackman's intervention, Fortune Brands Inc. was broken up and renamed
to Beam Inc. Bruce Schreiner, Fortune Brands Becomes Beam Inc., Sticks To Liquor, Bu sINI- SS
W[AEK (Oct. 3, 2011, 5:53 PM), available at http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/
D9052Tf-01.htm.
40. Beam, Inc. (BEAM): Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCi http://finance.yahoo.com/q/
hp?s=BEAM+Historical+Prices (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
41. Id.
42. Pershing Square's schedule 13D was filed with the SEC on October 8, 2010 at 5:10 PM.
Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., General Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial Ownership
(Form SC 13D) (Oct. 8, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789073/
000095012310092375/0000950123-10-092375-index.htm.
43. See Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., Schedule 13D (Form SC 13D) (Oct. 4, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789073/000095012310092375/cO6741scl3d.
htm.
44. Beam, Inc. (BEAM): Historical Prices, YAlloo! FINANUI , supra note 39.
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dow. The period prior to crossing the 5% beneficial ownership
threshold-from September 20, 2010, to the dark-colored diamond-
would remain untouched by any reform to the blockholder disclosure
window. During this period of time, hedge funds would be under no
obligation to report because they have not crossed the 5% threshold.4 5
In the debate over reforming the blockholder disclosure window,
there is no suggestion to lower the 5% disclosure threshold.4 6
Indeed, the purchases of the initial 5% ownership stake by hedge
funds prior to crossing the disclosure threshold can be at prices that
are a substantial discount to the market prices that follow the initial
public announcement of their acquisitions. In J.C. Penney's case, for
example, Pershing Square acquired an initial 4.9% block at an average
price of $20.69 prior to crossing the 5% level on September 28, 2010,
and Vornado acquired an initial 6.6% stake in a single call options
transaction at an underlying purchase price of $26.72 on the same
date.47 This would have still yielded an impressive profit. If these
hedge funds had sold at $33.30, the closing price ten days after disclo-
sure,4 8 they would have made a profit of approximately $147 million
45. Wachtell et al., supra note 2, at 6.
46. In light of the extraordinary profit that hedge funds can obtain prior to crossing the 5%
threshold and the economic analysis infra Part III on the costs and benefits of hedge fund activ-
ism, it is possible that the very existence of a minimum disclosure threshold encourages too
much hedge fund activism. Yet changing the disclosure threshold for section 13(d) would re-
quire congressional action. Accordingly, this Article focuses on the policy debate that is cur-
rently being conducted over reforming the section 13(d) filing window by SEC rulemaking
action alone under section 929R of the Dodd-Frank Act.
47. All of the calculations in this Subsection are on file with the author. The share prices
are taken from Item 5(c) of each hedge fund's J.C. Penney schedule 13D filing and exhibits
attached thereto. See Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., supra note 36; Vornado Realty Trust,
supra note 36. For call options, the "purchase price" is calculated based on intrinsic value, i.e.,
the sum of the cost of acquiring the option and its strike price, as this represents the minimum
price at which the buyer could acquire the underlying shares. Admittedly, calculating profit
based on call options' intrinsic value will understate the potential profit because the option itself
has value. But the option value is difficult to estimate in these cases, as many were over-the-
counter options that lack a market price. Rather than include option value in some cases and
not others, this calculation errs on the side of caution and utilizes the intrinsic value alone.
48. In most cases, hedge funds would not have sold this quickly. The existence of this
higher share price reflects investor expectations that the hedge fund activism will yield some
type of payoff for shareholders, which presumably takes longer than ten days. (That said, the
mere entrance of an activist hedge fund could prompt certain reforms that shareholders might
consider beneficial.) As discussed below, researchers who believe the efficient market hypothe-
sis often rely on event-day studies which look to share price returns in a certain post-event
window, e.g., 10 days, to determine whether the event creates long-term shareholder value. See
discussion infra Section III.A.1. While I criticize the efficient market hypothesis, see discussion
infra Section III.A.2, it is rational to use such a window to calculate a hedge fund's hypothetical
profit. Even if this higher share price does not reflect the creation of fundamental value because
markets are inefficient, hedge funds could still "sell into" this wave and dispose of the initial 5%.
Moreover, they could still obtain this profit on the remainder of their shares if the share price
remained at this level several months later, if, for example, the market had not yet internalized
the damage that excessive activism would cause. For a discussion of markets' temporal ineffi-
ciency, see discussion infra Section III.A.2.
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and $102 million on their initial stakes, respectively.49 Similarly, Per-
shing Square bought its initial 4.9% of Fortune Brands at an approxi-
mate average price of $42.52.50 If it had sold at the 10-day post-
disclosure closing price of $54.51," it would have made a profit of
approximately $86.5 million.52 While the latter figure is less than the
former two," both reflect a sizeable payoff for these activist hedge
funds for acquiring the initial 5% stake at significant discount to the
post-disclosure price.
Again, this payoff would remain untouched by Wachtell Lipton's
proposal." Rather, the petition focuses on the additional profit that
would result from stealthily acquiring additional shares during the ten-
day disclosure window." To illustrate how much is at stake, the aver-
age price of the J.C. Penney shares acquired by Pershing Square and
Vornado from September 28, 2010 to October 7, 2010 was $29.27 and
$27.39, respectively." If Pershing Square and Vornado had sold at the
ten-day post-disclosure closing price of $33.30, they would have made
a profit of approximately $193 million and $43 million on the stake
that they acquired during the 10-day window, respectively." Simi-
49. This is computed by subtracting the total purchase price each hedge fund paid prior to
and contemporaneously with crossing the 5% threshold from the product of the number of
shares acquired during this period and a closing price of $33.30 on October 18, 2010. The exact
trading data utilized for this computation is included in the schedule 13D filings and the calcula-
tions are on file with the author. See Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., supra note 37; Vor-
nado Realty Trust, supra note 37.
50. The calculations are on file with the author.
51. This price has been adjusted for stock splits and dividends.
52. As with J.C. Penney, the computation utilizes the actual purchase price included in the
trading data attached to Pershing Square's schedule 13D filing. See Pershing Square Capital
Mgmt., L.P., supra note 42.
53. This may have been because the hedge funds took a smaller stake in Fortune Brands
than J.C. Penney (11% as opposed to 27%), making it less certain that they could bring about
the type of improvements that would increase shareholder value (at least over the short-term).
See id. at 2; Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., supra note 36, at 2; Vornado Realty Trust,
supra note 36, at 2.
54. See Watchtell et al., supra note 2.
55. Id.
56. The calculations are on file with the author.
57. See Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., supra note 36 and Vornado Realty Trust,
supra note 36 for price and share information (calculations on file with author). As with the
initial period profit, this utilizes the actual trading data reported on the schedule 13D filings.
The computation subtracts the total purchase price each hedge fund paid subsequent to crossing
the 5% threshold (and prior to the 13D filing) from the product of the total number of shares
and the closing price of $33.30 on October 18, 2010. The computation treats cash-settled total
return swaps as common stock for purposes of this calculation, since the hedge funds the long
party would be able to realize their potential profit by unwinding the swaps and acquiring the
underlying shares. One might criticize the use of the $33.30 closing price as unrealistic because
the hedge funds could not sell 21% of the stock instantly without moving the price down. If it is
a rough approximation, however, of investors' anticipation of value creation-a proposition this
Article accepts with respect to short-term expectations-the price would not fall significantly
upon liquidation. Accordingly, these reflect a form of hypothetical profit. It is also a useful
10
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larly, Pershing Square acquired the remainder of its 10.9% stake in
Fortune Brands at the average price of $49.80 during the period from
October 4, 2010 to October 7, 2010. Had it sold at the ten-day post
disclosure price of $54.51, Pershing Square would have made a profit
of approximately $51.6 million on the stake it acquired during the
delayed disclosure period.58  This additional profit would be elimi-
nated under Wachtell Lipton's proposal.
Finally, shareholder activists continue to exploit the delayed disclo-
sure window to acquire large blocks of ownership at a substantial dis-
count to the post-disclosure market price. Most recently, in October
2012, Carl Ichan stealthily acquired 9.98% of Netflix at an average
price of $60.01 after crossing the 5% threshold.5 9 Had he sold at the
ten-day post-disclosure price of $78.19, Ichan would have made a
profit of approximately $52 million on the stake he acquired during
the delayed disclosure period alone.
B. Legislative History: The Williams Act of 1968 and Section 929R
of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
The legislative history of the ten-day window suggests that Congress
did not intend for it to be exploited through stealth accumulations.6 0
The ten-day window was enacted by the Williams Act of 1968, which
arose out of a concern with the increasing use of cash tender offers to
effect hostile takeovers.6 ' The legislation initially was introduced in
the 111th Congress by Senator Williams, who condemned "the cloak
of secrecy under which" a corporate raider is "permitted to operate
while obtaining the shares needed to put him on the road to successful
capture of a company. "62
As originally proposed, the bill would have required prior notice to
the SEC twenty days before making a cash tender for over five per-
cent of the a class of outstanding shares as well as disclosure upon
acquiring five percent beneficial ownership through open market
measure of the injury to trading counterparties who could have sold at the $33.30 closing price.
See discussion infra Section IV.C.2.
58. See Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., supra note 42 for price and share information
(calculations on file with the author). For methodology of profit calculations, see supra text
accompanying note 56.
59. See Icahn Capital, L.P., Schedule 13D (Form SC 13D) (Nov. 19, 2012), available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921669/000092846412000294/nflxschl3damd2ll1912.htm.
60. See Andrew E. Nagel, Andrew N. Vollmer & Paul R.Q. Wolfson, The Williams Act: A
Truly "Modern" Assessment, HARVARD LAw SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE &
FINANCIAL REGULATION (Oct. 22, 2011, 9:49 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/
10/22/the-williams-act-a-truly-%E2%80%9Cmodern%E2%80%9D-assessment/, for a summary
of the legislative history of the Williams Act of 1968.
61. Id.
62. 111 CONG. REC. 28,258 (Oct. 22, 1965).
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purchases. 3 The prior notice requirement led to strong opposition
from the SEC, which argued that a five-day post-acquisition notifica-
tion window would be "less burdensome" and more realistic in situa-
tions where prior notice might be impossible.64
Senator Williams subsequently introduced a modified bill to require
disclosure within seven days of acquiring ten percent beneficial own-
ership,6 5 followed by another amendment to lengthen the disclosure
window to ten days.6 6 These were the substantive terms that were
ultimately enacted as the Williams Act of 1968.6' Two years later, the
disclosure threshold was lowered to five percent.6 8 In Senator Wil-
liams's words, "[s]tock holdings of between 5 and 10 percent in [large
public] companies are in many instances a controlling interest. Here,
the need for the full disclosure requirements of the Securities Ex-
change Act are necessary for adequate investor protection." 69 This is
the disclosure requirement that applies today. 0
The ten-day blockholder disclosure window remained undisturbed
for thirty years. In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which provided in sec-
tion 929R:
(a) BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING.-Section 13 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended-(1) in
subsection (d)(1)-(A) by inserting after 'within ten days after such
acquisition' the following: 'or within such shorter time as the Commis-
sion may establish by rule.'72
This language was found in the initial draft of the Investor Protection
Act of 2009 submitted by House Committee on Financial Services.
In the "section-by-section analysis of the legislation," the Committee
explained the rationale behind the inclusion of this provision:
Section 105. Beneficial ownership and short swing profit reporting
This section provides the SEC with the authority to adopt rules to
shorten reporting timeframes and help the markets receive more
63. Id. at 28,259 (Oct. 22, 1965); S. 2731, 89th Cong. § 2 (1965).
64. 112 CONG. REc. 19,004 (Aug. 11, 1966) ("Indeed, we envision some types of situations
in which compliance with an advance notice requirement would be impossible, such as acquisi-
tions by inheritance or by gift of which the recipient had no advance notice.").
65. 113 CONG. RLC. 856 (Jan. 18, 1967); S. 510, 90th Cong. § 1 (1967).
66. 113 CONG. REC. 24,662 (Aug. 30, 1967).
67. Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454.
68. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497.
69. 116 CONG. REC. 3024 (Feb. 10, 1970).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2012).
71. See dates of enactment for Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 and
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1866 (2010) for thirty-year gap between the passage of the Williams Act and The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
72. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 929R.
73. H.R. REP. No. 111-687, at 6 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
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timely information concerning substantial ownership interests in issu-
ers. This change is important for purposes of obtaining more accurate
pricing of listed securities. 74
It thus appears that the Committee was concerned with the poten-
tial for mispricing during the ten-day window. Indeed, as the example
of J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands demonstrates, the difference be-
tween the average price during the ten-day window and the price fol-
lowing disclosure can be substantial. In the case of J.C. Penney,
exploiting this difference led to over $200 million in profit for two
activist hedge funds. 76 The Committee's intent seems plainly directed
to drawing the SEC's attention to the potential exploitation of this
pricing differential.
The Dodd-Frank Act also displayed concern for the growing use of
synthetic instruments such as cash-settled total return swaps, which
permit the rapid accumulation of equity ownership via indirect means
with a minimal impact on share prices. These have been used by
hedge funds to acquire large blocks of shares at minimal cost,78 and
were utilized by Pershing Square in its stealth accumulation of J.C.
Penney shares.7 1 Section 766(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act specifically
authorizes the SEC to include "security-based swaps" within the defi-
nition of beneficial ownership under section 13(d).8 o However, such
swaps constitute beneficial ownership only if the SEC so designates:
[A] person shall be deemed to acquire beneficial ownership of an eq-
uity security based on the purchase or sale of a security-based swap,
only to the extent that the Commission, by rule, determines after con-
sultation with the prudential regulators and the Secretary of the Trea-
74. Id. at 76.
75. See J.C. Penney Company, Inc. (JCP): Historical Prices, supra note 34; Beam, Inc.
(BEAM): Historical Prices, supra note 39.
76. See Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., supra note 36; Vornado Realty Trust, supra
note 36; discussion supra note 56.
77. Cash-settled total return swaps are a form of equity derivatives that transfer the entire
credit risk and market risk of an asset to the holder without actually acquiring ownership of the
underlying security. See, e.g., Patricia A. Koval, Use of Derivatives by Shareholder Activists,
TORYS ON MERGERS AND AcQuISIrIONS (APR. 20, 2011), http://www.torys.com/Publications/
Documents/Publication%20PDFs/MA2011-3.pdf (describing the use of these swaps by hedge
fund activists to acquire exposure to the underlying securities without constituting beneficial
ownership and explaining how they may be easily converted to voting securities).
78. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Big Investors Appear Out of Thin Air, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Nov. 1, 2010, 8:25 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/sorkin-big-inves-
tors-appear-out-of-thin-air/ ("The use of derivatives to create stealth positions is even more
worrisome.").
79. See Pershing Square Capital Mgmt. L.P., supra note 36; Maxwell Murphy, How Bill
Ackman Stalked J. C. Penney, WALL ST.J. BLOGS: DEAL JOURNAL (Oct. 8, 2010, 3:50 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/10/08/how-bill-ackman-stalked-jc-penney/ (mentioning Bill Ackman's
use of cash-settled total return swaps).
80. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,§ 766(e), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(o) (2012)).
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sury, that the purchase or sale of the security-based swap ... provides
incidents of ownership comparable to direct ownership of the equity
security, and that it is necessary to achieve the purposes of this section
that the purchase or sale of the security-based swaps, or class of secur-
ity-based swap, be deemed the acquisition of beneficial ownership of
the equity security.8
In a recent decision, the Second Circuit left unresolved the question of
whether cash-settled total return equity swaps constitute beneficial
ownership under the existing section 13(d) and rule 13d-3.82 The po-
tential for rapid stealth accumulations during the ten-day window in
light of the increasing use of cash-settled total-return swaps led to a
vibrant academic and policy debate as discussed in the next Section.
C. The Academic and Policy Debate Over Shortening the Ten-Day
Window
The current debate surrounding shortening the disclosure window
began with a rulemaking petition submitted by Wachtell Lipton to the
SEC." Wachtell Lipton argued that the ten-day window contravenes
the purpose of the Williams Act by permitting rapid stealth acquisi-
tions of quasi-controlling blocks, which was precisely what Congress
sought to prohibit by enacting the blockholder disclosure reporting
requirements.' Moreover, Wachtell Lipton claimed, the recent exam-
ples of J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands vividly demonstrate that the
ten-day window is no longer suited to an age where large blocks of
shares may be rapidly accumulated, particularly when synthetic own-
ership, e.g. derivatives, permit even faster accumulation of net long
equity positions."
In response, Professors Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson
criticized Wachtell Lipton's petition and advocated that the current
ten-day period remain unchanged.8 6 Bebchuk and Jackson claim that
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(o) (2012) (emphasis added).
82. CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 284 (2d Cir. 2011)
(remanding to the district court on different grounds). But see id. at 301 (Winter, J., concurring)
("In the absence of some other agreement governing the disposition of shares purchased to
hedge a swap position, merely having a long position in a cash-settled total-return equity swap
does not constitute having the power, directly or indirectly, to direct the disposition of shares
that a counterparty purchases to hedge its swap positions, and thus does not constitute having
'investment power' for purposes of Rule 13d-3(a).").
83. See Wachtell et al., supra note 2.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id. at 6-8.
86. Bebchuk & Jackson Jr., supra note 7. In a recent reply, four partners from Wachtell
Lipton reiterated their argument that Bebchuk and Jackson's cost-benefit analysis is flawed be-
cause it is "missing ... any explanation of how their position - their conception of how the
Section 13(d) reporting rules should operate - is consistent with the clear purpose of the stat-
ute." Adam 0. Emmerich et al., Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law
and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power (Co-
2013] 217
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the SEC should evaluate the suitability of the blockholder disclosure
window in light of academic research regarding the beneficial role of
activist investors in public companies." They discuss the empirical fi-
nancial literature finding a correlation between hedge fund activism
and shareholder value" and argue that the ten-day window functions
as a form of compensation to blockholders for monitoring and disci-
plining management." They argue that such compensation is essen-
tial because as non-controlling shareholders activist, blockholders
only share pro rata in the benefits of their activism.90
This Article advocates a balanced approach to resolving this debate.
Wachtell Lipton correctly points out that the purpose of the disclosure
requirements in the Williams Act was to prevent stealth acquisitions.
Yet while the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly empowered the SEC to
shorten the disclosure window, the Act did not limit the SEC's discre-
tion to fulfilling the historical purpose of the Williams Act.91 As a
matter of positive law, agency rulemaking is more than a historical
inquiry into congressional intent. Administrative agencies are obli-
gated to consider the costs and benefits of various policy alternatives
and enact rules that further the public interest.
More fundamentally, Wachtell Lipton's descriptive claim (what
"is") does not imply a normative outcome (what "should be").92 Even
under the extreme assumption that the SEC must, as a matter of posi-
tive law, shorten the disclosure window because technological innova-
tions render the letter of the law no longer effective at fulfilling its
purpose, this does not imply that a shorter disclosure window necessa-
rily would be in firms' or society's best interest. Put differently, Con-
gress may have erred. Blockholder disclosure ultimately may not be
socially beneficial. Apart from the doctrinal question of what the
SEC is bound by law to consider as an administrative agency, it is
essential to address the normative question of what is best for society.
Answering this normative question requires finding a justification
external to the descriptive content of the law itself. The law-and-eco-
nomics methodology prevalent in corporate and securities law gener-
ally assumes that promoting Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-i.e., producing
gains to society that exceed losses-should be the normative goal that
lumbia Law Sch. Ctr. For Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 428, Aug. 27, 2012), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2138945.
87. Bebchuk & Jackson Jr., supra note 7.
88. See discussion infra Section III.A.
89. Bebchuk & Jackson Jr., supra note 7, at 47.
90. Id.
91. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act §929R, supra note 70.
92. See Wachtell et al., supra note 2.
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the law advances." A proposal to shorten the blockholder disclosure
window should be justified through economic analysis, not solely by
pointing to the descriptive content of legislative history.
To their credit, Bebchuk and Jackson cite to economic and financial
research to make a normative claim that the ten-day window is better
for society than a shorter alternative. 94 Yet they look solely at the
benefits of hedge fund activism without considering the costs that ac-
tivism-particularly excessive activism-may impose.95 It is impossi-
ble to compare the ten-day window to a shorter period without
evaluating the costs and benefits of both alternatives.
As described in Sections III.B and III.C, if the current regime en-
courages excessive activism, there are two potential sources of costs:
(1) harm to target firms in the form of managerial short-termism,
which may not be reflected in empirical event-day studies if markets
are inefficient; and (2) social externalities such as chilling effects
among market participants resulting from trading on asymmetric in-
formation and the non-economic harm of depriving trading partners
of autonomy. Without discussing these potential costs, the net social
utility resulting from the ten-day window remains unknown, even if
empirical studies suggest that hedge fund activism does bring value to
firms under certain conditions.
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DELAYED
BLOCKHOLDER DISCLOSURE
This Part discusses the costs and benefits of delayed blockholder
disclosure. Hedge fund activism may create value by monitoring and
disciplining management, but these benefits must be balanced against
the potential for inducing short-termism among target firms. Moreo-
ver, delayed blockholder disclosure imposes economic and non-eco-
nomic costs on society that must be considered as well.
A. CREATING VALUE BY MONITORING AND DISCIPLINING
MANAGEMENT
1. Agency Costs, Hedge Fund Activism and Shareholder Value
Many scholars consider hedge fund activism beneficial because
large blockholders have natural incentives to monitor and discipline
93. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487, 488 (1979) (discussing the importance of
efficiency in law).
94. Bebchuk & Jackson Jr., supra note 7, at 47.
95. Interestingly, when Bebchuk and Jackson Jr. discuss "costs," they are referring to the
potential costs of Wachtell Lipton's proposal, not to the social cost imposed by the status quo of
ten-day delayed disclosure on firms and society. Id. at 50.
2013] 219
16
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 [2013], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol35/iss2/4
220 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:203
management, which can reduce the principal/agent problem inherent
in corporate governance. 9 6 Ever since Jensen and Meckling's seminal
discussion of agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership
from control,'97 corporate governance scholars have sought ways to en-
courage monitoring incentives in firms with disparate ownership such
as publicly traded companies." Many have pointed to the threat of a
hostile takeover as an effective means of disciplining management,
noting that "[e]conomic analysis and evidence indicate that the mar-
ket for corporate control is benefitting shareholders, society, and the
corporate form of organization."99 The basic theory is that unhappy
shareholders can sell their shares to a hostile bidder and thereby effect
a change of management once that bidder obtains a controlling block
of stock. Empirical event-day studies have shown support for the hy-
pothesis that hostile bidders create value for target firms. 00
There are many similarities between takeovers and hedge fund ac-
tivism, most notably that blockholders have a greater incentive than
other shareholders to monitor management in order to maximize the
value of their shares.o However, regulatory and structural con-
straints, such as conflicts of interests, limit the effectiveness of activ-
ism by traditional institutional investors like mutual funds, e.g., when
the target firm's management is a client of these funds' parent finan-
cial institutions.1 02 Recently, hedge funds have stepped into this void,
largely free of these constraints and with compensation structures that
96. E.g.,Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. AND TRENDS IN FIN.
185 (2009).
97. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
98. Leading studies on this problem include Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 295 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301 (1983).
99. Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP, Win-
ter 1988, at 21; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) (discussing the role of take-
overs in corporate governance).
100. Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six
Controversial Investors, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 555, 557 (1985).
101. For a comprehensive discussion, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 1048-69.
102. Id. at 1048 (citing Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institu-
tional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 813-16 (1992); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 451 (1991)). See
also Stuart Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals And Shareholder Activ-
ism: The Role Of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 276-79 (2000) (discussing the role
of institutional investors in shareholder activism). See generally Anat R. Admati et al., Large
Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1097
(1994); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); Ron-
ald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional
Investors, 43 STAN L. REV. 863 (1991) (analyzing the impact of institutional investors on firms).
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make them able to "benefit directly and substantially from achieving
high absolute returns."' 0 3
Consistent with this hypothesis, empirical studies have found a cor-
relation between announcements of hedge fund activism and stock
price increases. In a recent study, Alon Bray, Wei Jiang, Frank
Partnoy and Randall Thomas found abnormal returns of 7% from
13D filings revealing activist hedge fund investments using an event-
day methodology with a window of +/- 20 days.10 4 This study utilized
an original dataset and contains several interesting findings, including
that a median maximum ownership stake of 9.1% and a 95th percen-
tile ownership stake of 31.5%, suggesting that activist hedge funds are
not seeking to acquire their targets. 10 Similarly, April Klein and
Emanuel Zur find that targets of activist investors (including hedge
funds and other types of private investors) "earn 10.2% average ab-
normal stock returns during the period surrounding the initial Sched-
ule 13D." 10 6 Both of these studies find that abnormal results hold in
the one-year period following the schedule 13D announcement.1 0 7
Other studies show indirect benefits from outside blockholder
activism.1 08
103. Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 1065.
104. Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008).
105. Bray et al, supra note 95, at 1732.
106. April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and
Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 188 (2009).
107. Bray et al., supra note 104, at 1730-31; Klein & Zur, supra note 106, at 188. Bray et al.
maintain an updated table reporting long-term average returns for targets of hedge fund activism
and claim that "the evidence clearly refutes the market over-reaction hypothesis and supports
the hypothesis that hedge fund activism creates value for shareholders." Bray et al., Hedge Fund
Activism: Updated Tables and Figures, at 11, http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/%7Ebrav/HFactiv-
ism March 2012.pdf (last visited Sep. 16, 2012). However, Bray et al. utilize a calendar-time
portfolio holding methodology. Id. ("We report regression estimates and t-statistics from equal-
and value-weighted calendar-time portfolio regressions."). The use of a calendar-time portfolio
method has been criticized because "in nonrandom samples, the calendar-time portfolio meth-
ods often yield misspecified test statistics." John D. Lyon et al., Improved Methods for Tests of
Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns, 54 J. FIN. 165, 193 (1999). The dataset utilized by Bray et al.
is plainly a nonrandom sample, as it consists of "236 activist hedge funds and 1,059 hedge fund-
target pairs for the period 2001 to 2006, involving 882 unique target companies." Bray et al.,
supra note 104, at 1739. Accordingly, long-run inference based on calendar-time portfolio meth-
ods should be viewed with suspicion.
108. Bebchuk & Jackson Jr., supra note 7, at 48 (citing Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mul-
lainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, 116 Q. J. ECON.
901, 903 (2001); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, 65 J. FIN. 2363,
2365 (2010); James A. Brickley et al., Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amend-
ments, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 267 (1988); Anil Shivdasani, Board Composition, Ownership Structure,
and Hostile Takeovers, 16 J. AccT. & ECON. 167 (1993); Anup Agrawal & Tareque Nasser,
Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, Turnover and Firm Valuation (Nov. 27, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), http://bama.ua.edu/-aagrawal/IDB-CEO.pdf).
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While it is not without controversy,' 09 the use of event-day studies is
prevalent in corporate governance studies.'1 o As two prominent
scholars put it, "[e]vent studies, relying on the efficient market hy-
pothesis, assume that public information is incorporated into stock
prices and that stock prices change when new information is re-
vealed.""' The efficient market hypothesis implies that the positive
abnormal returns found in the studies by Bray et al. and Klein and
Zur reflect the creation of fundamental value.' 12 The market's re-
sponse to hedge fund activism-bidding up the price of target firm
shares-is efficient. It is incorporating all available public information
and concluding that hedge fund activism will improve the future cash
flow of shareholders of target firms. Bray et al. and Klein and Zur
generally assume that the efficient market hypothesis is accurate, as
indicated by their conclusion that these abnormal returns unequivo-
cally establish that hedge fund activism creates shareholder value.1 13
2. Inefficient Markets and Long-Term Value Creation
The problem with relying on event-day studies as conclusive evi-
dence that hedge funds create shareholder value is that there is a vast
body of behavioral finance literature that calls the efficient market
hypothesis into question.1 14 This research began with drawing atten-
tion to empirical anomalies in the data utilized to support the efficient
market hypothesis in the traditional studies."1 ' Behavioral finance
scholars found evidence supporting short-term momentum and "feed-
back," the tendency for asset prices to form a bubble based on ever-
increasing expectations of higher prices, only to come crashing down
thereafter."' Theoretical models were developed to demonstrate the
109. See infra Subsection Ill.A.2.
110. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical
Studies of Corporate Law, 4 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 381 (2002).
111. Id. at 398.
112. For a traditional overview of the efficient market hypothesis from one of its most ardent
defenders, see Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991); Eugene F.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
113. Bray et al., supra note 104, at 1732 ("Our findings have important implications for the
policy debate about hedge fund activism. .. . [O]ur results suggest that activist hedge funds are
not short-term holders. Activists also appear to generate substantial value for target firm share-
holders."); Klein & Zur, supra note 106, at 192 ("Generally, a firm's stock price increases around
the 13D filing date that identifies a new blockholder, indicating that the market interprets this
event as value increasing.").
114. For an overview of the behavioral finance criticism of the efficient market hypothesis,
see Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON. PERSP.,
Winter 2003, at 83.
115. See id. at 84 (discussing the empirical anomalies in Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970)); Lawrence H. Sum-
mers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591, 591 (1986).
116. E.g., Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J.
FIN. 793 (1985); Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Sheridan Titman, Returns to Buying Winners and Sell-
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limitations of arbitrage to correct these anomalies as predicted by the
efficient market hypothesis, and these models were supported by em-
pirical studies. 17 The asset bubbles of the late 1990s and 2000s in
technology stocks and the housing market led to a rejection of the
efficient market hypothesis yet again."s
These developments in behavioral finance suggest that the empiri-
cal results championed in support of the notion that hedge fund activ-
ism creates shareholder value should be viewed with suspicion.
Increases in target firm share prices upon schedule 13D announce-
ments may be irrational rather than reflecting increased fundamental
value. Purchasers may be overly optimistic regarding the long-term
benefits of hedge fund activism or anticipate that counterparties in
future transactions will be overly optimistic and pay more than the
fundamental value of these shares. In the latter case, bidding up the
price of the stock would be rational for current purchasers who antici-
pate an irrational overpayment by subsequent acquirers. Indeed, em-
pirical studies have found that investors systematically overvalue
takeover targets.119 An intertemporal transfer payment from future
to current shareholders does not reflect an increase in fundamental
value.120
Incidentally, a schedule 13D filing signals that it is more likely that a
firm will undergo a takeover or other change-of-control transaction
where a control premium would be paid.121 Filing a schedule 13D dis-
closure rather than a schedule 13G disclosure implies that the pur-
ing Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency, 48 J. FIN. 65 (1993). See generally Shiller,
supra note 114, at 96 (critiquing efficient market hypothesis).
117. E.g., Douglas T. Breeden, An Intertemporal Asset Pricing Model with Stochastic Con-
sumption and Investment Opportunities, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 265 (1979); J. Bradford De Long et al.,
Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990); William N. Goetzmann &
Massimo Massa, Daily Momentum and Contrarian Behavior Of Index Fund Investors, 37 J. FIN.
& QUANT. ANALYSIS 375 (2002). See generally Shiller, supra note 114, at 96-97 (criticizing ration-
ality assumptions behind efficient market hypothesis).
118. E.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 5 (2000); Paul Krugman, How Did
Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/
magazine/06Economic-t.html. Paul Krugman summed it up nicely: "In a 2007 interview, Eugene
Fama, the father of the efficient-market hypothesis, declared that 'the word 'bubble' drives me
nuts,' and went on to explain why we can trust the housing market . . . In short, the belief in
efficient financial markets blinded many if not most economists to the emergence of the biggest
financial bubble in history. And efficient-market theory also played a significant role in inflating
that bubble in the first place." Krugman, supra. See aiso Geoffrey Hodgson, Reforming Eco-
nomics after the Financial Crisis, 2 GLOBAL POLICY 190 (May 2011) (discussing the need to
reconsider traditional economic theories after the financial crisis).
119. E.g., James S. Ang & Yingmei Cheng, Direct Evidence On The Market-Driven Acquisi-
tion Theory, 29 J. FIN. RESEARCH 199 (2006); Ming Dong et al., Does Investor Misvaluation
Drive the Takeover Market?, 61 J. FIN. 725 (2006); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock
Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295 (2003).
120. See generally, Ang & Cheng, supra note 118 (discussing effect of overvaluation).
121. Emmerich et al., supra note 85, at 9-10.
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chaser has the "purpose" or "effect" of "changing or influencing the
control of the issuer." 122 The implied control intent in a schedule 13D
filing and the increased likelihood of a control premium payoff likely
explains much of the share price bounce.123 But this sheds no light on
whether hedge fund activism creates fundamental value for target
firms over the long-term.
More fundamentally, a balanced approach to evaluating the op-
timality of the blockholder disclosure window requires considering
whether hedge fund activism always benefits target firms. Even if
hedge fund intervention sometimes creates value, there might be an
aggregate level of activism that on balance does more harm than
good. As discussed in the next Section, the potential for hedge fund
activism to induce short-termism suggests that it may not always be
beneficial.
B. DESTROYING VALUE THROUGH SHORT-TERMISM: A SUMMARY
OF THE MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
Largely missing from the legal debate over shortening the
blockholder disclosure window is the body of management and ac-
counting research that demonstrates that short-termism is a very real
problem faced by firms today. The legal literature has recognized
short-termism as a possibility: a well-known law review article on
hedge fund activism identified short-termism as the only "potentially
serious problem" that might require regulatory redress but concluded
that "a sufficient case for legal intervention has not been made." 124
These authors argued that it is unclear whether the stock market suf-
fers from myopia, i.e., whether it undervalues long-term profit in favor
of short-term profit.12 ' They remained unconvinced that myopia ex-
ists and raised the possibility that "allegations of myopia are a foil for
122. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(c)(1) (2012). Rule 13d-1 permits filing a schedule 13G if the ac-
quirer "[h]as not acquired the securities with any purpose, or with the effect, of changing or
influencing the control of the issuer, or in connection with or as a participant in any transaction
having that purpose or effect . .. other than activities solely in connection with a nomination
under § 240.14a-11." Id.
123. Cf Emmerich, et al., supra note 85, at 10 ("[A]ctivist 13D filers often agitate for some
corporate change - for example, a sale of the company or recapitalization - that may be ex-
pected to have a short-term, positive effect on a company's stock price."); see also Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461
(1986) (discussing the dynamics of large blockholders and the likelihood of a change-of-control).
124. Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 1022, 1068, 1089. For additional analyses of short-
termism, see Lynne Dallas, Short-Termism, The Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37
J. CORP. L. 264 (2011); Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism and Managerial
Myopia (unpublished manuscript, Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract id=1802840; Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism (unpublished
manuscript, Oct. 1, 2011), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1378&context=lsfp (last visited Sep. 16, 2012).
125. Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 1084-85.
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managerial failure to deliver results."l 2 6 However, they acknowledge
the theoretical and empirical support in the finance literature for the
existence of market myopia12 and suggest that the growth of private
equity firms indicates that myopia indeed may be a "serious
problem."1
Yet there is a body of management and accounting research dedi-
cated specifically to short-termism.129  In a 1996 article, management
scholar Kevin J. Laverty developed five theoretical explanations for
how suboptimal short-termism might exist within a firm: flawed man-
agement practices, managerial opportunism, stock market myopia,
fluid and impatient capital, and information asymmetries. 13 0 Laverty
argued that short-termism results from the problem of "intertemporal
choice," when there are "decisions in which, with respect to maximiz-
ing profit or achieving some other objective, the course of action that
is best in the short term is not the same course of action that is best
over the long run."13 1 Laverty concluded that short-termism is caused
by a complex interaction of individual, organizational, and economic
factors, necessitating a research agenda that focuses specifically on
how managers respond to the challenge of intertemporal choice.13 2
Management scholar Brian Bushee, at the Wharton School, subse-
quently found substantial empirical support for the link between the
short-term orientation of certain institutional investors (e.g. hedge
funds) and managerial short-termism within firms.133 In a 1998 article
published in the Accounting Review, Bushee showed that "predomi-
126. Id. at 1085 (citing Barry Rosenstein, Activism Is Good for All Shareholders, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2006).
127. Id. (citing Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Why Defer to Managers? A
Strong-Form Efficiency Model (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No.
05-19, 2005); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and
Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148 (1990); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient
Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655 (1989); Jeremy C. Stein,
Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61 (1988)). Nonetheless, despite
citing the accounting literature demonstrating the empirical existence of myopia as we describe
infra p. 31, Kahan & Rock maintain that "the empirical evidence on the extent and magnitude of
myopia is sketchy at best." Id.
128. Id. at 1086.
129. Adherents to the efficient market hypothesis will likely object that markets "see
through" accounting techniques and should internalize all available information about the effect
of short-termism, such that finance is the only discipline required to determine whether a given
phenomenon increases shareholder value. Yet as explained supra Section III.A.2, the efficient
market hypothesis largely lacks empirical support whereas the existence of market myopia is
based on theoretical and empirical research.
130. Kevin J. Laverty, Economic "Short-Termism": The Debate, The Unresolved Issues, and
the Implications For Management Practice And Research, 21 ACAD. OF MGM1 REV. 825, 835
(1996).
131. Id. at 828.
132. Id. at 847.
133. Brian Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Be-
havior, 73 Accr. REV. 305, 330 (1998).
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nant ownership by 'transient' institutions-which have high portfolio
turnover and use momentum trading strategies . .. significantly in-
creases the likelihood that managers cut R&D to manage earn-
ings."l 3 4 Hedge funds are the prototypical type of "transient"
institutional investor, often holding shares for less than one day. 1 3 5 In
a subsequent piece, Bushee found further empirical support for a cor-
relation between transient institutional blockholding and managerial
myopia:
The results indicate that high levels of ownership by transient institu-
tions are associated with overweighting of the near-term earnings
component of value and underweighting of the long-term earnings
component. The future-returns test finds trading strategy returns that
are consistent in sign with mispricing and statistically significant two,
three, and four years after the portfolio formation date. Thus, tran-
sient institutions not only exhibit strong preferences for near-term
earnings, but these preferences also translate into significant
misvaluations.1 36
Bushee's findings are consistent with other empirical studies that sug-
gest a correlation between transient institutional ownership and a will-
ingness to inflate short-term earnings.1 37
These results do not imply that markets always inefficiently ascribe
more value to short-term results. The finance research cited by
Bebchuk and Jackson is not necessarily erroneous. Even if hedge
fund activism has historically benefitted companies on average, tech-
nological advances and innovations in synthetic ownership may have
just now rendered the ten-day window an incentive for a superoptimal
level of activism. Markets may have not yet internalized the detri-
mental effects of aggregate levels of excessive hedge fund activism.
While empirical research demonstrates that short-termism may im-
pose a cost on firms subject to hedge fund intervention, this cost need
not be constant and may rise proportionately with the overall level of
hedge fund activism. This could occur, for example, if managers tend
to be more myopic to the extent they observe higher aggregate levels
of aggregate activism.
134. Id. at 307.
135. Kahan & Rock, supra note 101, at 1083 ("Hedge funds come close to being the arche-
typal short-term investor. For some funds, holding shares for a full day represents a 'long-term'
investment.") (citing Raagas De Ramos, Concerns over Hedge Funds Rise as Market Volatility
Rises Globally, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2006, at C5).
136. Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run
Value?, 18 CONTEMP. Accr. RES. 207, 213 (2001).
137. E.g., Victor L. Bernard & Jacob K. Thomas, Evidence That Stock Prices Do Not Fully
Reflect The Implications Of Current Earnings For Future Earnings, 13 J. Accr. & ECON. 305
(1990); Katherine Guthrie & Jan Sokolowsky, Large Shareholders and the Pressure to Manage
Earnings, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 302 (2010); see also Lynn Stout, The Mythical Benefits OfShareholder
Control, 93 VA. L. REv. 789 (2007) (discussing importance of board governance).
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This relationship may not be linear or even continuous: it may
"jump up" at certain levels of aggregate activism if, for example,
CEOs observe a "critical mass" of hedge fund activism and dramati-
cally increase the focus on short-term earnings after this level. The
historically positive correlation between hedge fund schedule 13D an-
nouncements and target firm share prices may simply indicate that the
market is inefficiently misestimating the shape of this "cost curve,"
i.e., the distribution of the cost of short-termism resulting from this
higher aggregate level of overall hedge fund intervention.138 Regula-
tory policy must take into consideration the potential for detrimen-
tally excessive activism in the future, even if markets have yet to do
so.
In short, despite the difficulty of reconciling short-termism with the
efficient market hypothesis, a substantial body of research suggests
that hedge funds' focus on short-term earnings encourages managerial
myopia. As a matter of regulatory policy, any consideration of the
costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure would be incom-
plete without weighing the potential harm caused by short-termism.
C. THE SOCIAL EXTERNALITIES OF DELAYED BLOCKHOLDER
DISCLOSURE
In addition to potentially destroying long-term shareholder value by
facilitating excessive hedge fund activism, delayed blockholder disclo-
sure imposes social externalities as well. Delayed disclosure is similar
to insider trading because during the ten-day window the hedge fund
is trading on the material, nonpublic information regarding its accu-
mulated holdings. Moreover, unlike with insider trading, there is no
possible benefit from the dissemination of inside information regard-
ing the company. 13 9 As the debate over reforming the section 13(d)
disclosure window concerns regulatory policy, it is essential to con-
sider these social effects as well.
1. Impairing Liquidity, Higher Transaction Costs and Chilling
Effects
Similar to insider trading, delayed blockholder disclosure permits
trading on asymmetric information. When a hedge fund accumulates
more than 5% beneficial ownership and trades without disclosing this
ownership information, it captures the entire premium that would
have accrued to the share price if this information regarding its level
of ownership were disclosed immediately. Admittedly, trading during
138. For an example of such a cost curve, see discussion infra Section IV.A.
139. See discussion infra p. 34-36.
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the ten-day window does not constitute insider trading as a matter of
doctrinal law. Insider trading doctrine requires a violation of a fiduci-
ary duty or other duty of trust and confidence under either the classi-
cal or misappropriation theory.1 4 0 There is no such fiduciary duty as a
matter of doctrinal law when material nonpublic information is cre-
ated by an outside investor.
However, an economic justification for the prohibition on insider
trading is that trading on asymmetric information leads to increased
transaction costs and reduced liquidity as market makers adjust the
bid/ask spread to compensate for losses in trading with insiders hold-
ing superior information about the share price. 141 In the words of one
scholar:
The far more serious concern regarding the harm suffered by price-
function traders due to insider trading is the likelihood that market
professionals do not absorb these losses themselves, but instead pass
those costs on to public investors by altering their prices to reflect the
risk of insider trading borne by market professionals, leading to in-
creased bid-ask spreads and a potentially less liquid securities mar-
ket. . .. [A]t least some studies indicate that markets characterized by
weaker insider trading regimes are less liquid than those markets in
which prohibitions against in- sider trading are stringently enforced.142
Incidentally, recent theoretical and empirical research suggests that
information asymmetry raises firms' cost of capital more generally,
particularly in imperfect markets. 143
140. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (explaining that insider
trading liability arises from violating a duty to disclose which is present only when there is a
relationship of agency, fiduciary, or a "person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence"); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 663 (1997) ("[M]isappropriation theory
bars only 'trading on the basis of information that the wrongdoer converted to his own use in
violation of some fiduciary, contractual, or similar obligation to the owner or rightful possessor
of the information."') (quoting Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of
Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOISTRA L.REv. 101, 122 (1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
141. See, e.g., Hayne E. Leland, Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?, 100 J. Pot. ECON.
859 (1992); Michael J. Fishman and Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of
Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. EcON. 106 (1992). The literature on this so-called "adverse selection"
theory is vast. See generally Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A
Critical Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REv. 83 (2004) (criti-
quing the adverse selection theory in the context of insider trading but also providing a compre-
hensive review of the literature).
142. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 443,
469-70 (2001) (citing Laura N. Beny, A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Agency and
Market Theories of Insider Trading (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Kimberly D.
Krawiec); Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazcm Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading (2000) (un-
published manuscript, on file with Kimberly D. Krawiec)). This analysis is accepted even by
advocates of considering legalizing insider trading. E.g., David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Ma-
cey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1449, 1457 (1986).
143. E.g., David Easley & Maureen O'hara, Information and the Cost of Capital, 59 J. FIN.
1553 (2004); John S. Hughes, Jing Liu & Jun Liu, Information Asymmetry, Diversification, and
Cost of Capital, 82 Accr. REV. 705 (2007); Maureen O'Hara, Presidential Address: Liquidity and
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These concerns are particularly relevant to delayed blockholder dis-
closure. Market participants who sell to hedge funds engaging in
stealth accumulations of substantial blocks of ownership will have lost
the opportunity to benefit from the disclosure premium when the ben-
eficial ownership is disclosed upon expiration of the ten-day window.
As vividly demonstrated by the examples of J.C. Penney and Fortune
Brands, this post-disclosure premium can be substantial.14 As hedge
fund activism and stealth acquisitions during the ten-day window in-
crease, it is quite possible that market makers will price this risk of
trading with hedge funds holding secret information regarding share
accumulations into bid/ask spreads, impairing liquidity and raising
transaction costs for market participants.
This is particularly likely in light of the difference between a sched-
ule 13D and 13G filing discussed previously.1 4 5 By permitting trading
on asymmetric information regarding an upcoming schedule 13D fil-
ing, the ten-day window deprives counterparties of the opportunity to
capture the short-term benefit of the activist's change-of-control in-
tent. The examples of J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands demonstrate
how this short-term payoff could dramatically move share prices, sug-
gesting that the potential loss from trading with a blockholder engag-
ing in a stealth acquisition is substantial, and thus, more likely to
affect market liquidity.
Moreover, as with insider trading, permitting hedge funds to trade
during the ten-day window, without disclosing accumulated share
ownership and unilaterally capturing the premium that would inure
upon disclosure, would engender a distrust of capital markets among
investors. By undermining the values of equal opportunity and trans-
parency that encourage participation in the capital markets, trading on
asymmetric information could have a substantial chilling effect. In the
words of former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt: "Our markets are
strong because investors are confident of their basic fairness. Trading
on inside information ... damages the entire structure of our markets,
because it deeply shakes this vital investor confidence. It can espe-
cially demoralize individual investors." 1 4 6
Some scholars have criticized this position, arguing that if insider
trading does not actually harm investors, it cannot have a psychologi-
Price Discovery, 58 J. FIN. 1335 (2003); Richard A. Lambert, Christian Leuz & Robert E. Ver-
recchia, Information Asymmetry, Information Precision, and the Cost of Capital, 16 REV. FIN. 1
(2011).
144. See graphs supra p. 9.
145. See discussion supra p. 28.
146. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n., A Question of Integrity: Promoting
Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading, Remarks at the SEC Speaks Conference (Feb.
27, 1988), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch202.txt, at 6.
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cal chilling effect. 14 7 But this critique takes a narrow view of harm.
Economic harm is just one type of harm-loss of trust and confidence
in a fair market is an independent psychological harm that could lead
some investors to refuse to participate out of fear of losing to insiders
for whom the game is rigged. To use one scholar's analogy of gam-
bling: some investors may indeed choose not to play "without an ap-
propriate adjustment of the odds,"'14 8 but that is a loss for society as
well, in the non-economic sense of egalitarian participation in
markets. 1 4 9
Finally, the primary economic justification advanced by proponents
of legalization of insider trading-signaling information to improve
stock price accuracy-does not justify delayed blockholder disclosure
but rather weighs in favor of immediate transparency.' Under this
theory, insider trading is beneficial because it acts as a signaling de-
vice, improving the accuracy of stock prices without forcing firms to
disclose confidential information. 5 Insiders are essentially "selling"
their material nonpublic information to the market, which improves
overall market efficiency by making prices more accurate. 1 5 2
While this rationale has been criticized,' 5 3 it plainly militates in
favor of disclosure when applied to outsiders holding material non-
public information. There would seem to be no better way to ensure
accurate stock prices than forcing immediate disclosure upon acquir-
ing beneficial ownership in excess of the 5% threshold. This Article is
not advocating a mandatory rule of universal immediate disclosure,154
but the importance of price efficiency constitutes yet another cost of
147. E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties Into the Federal
Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1241 (1995) ("If investors are not
injured by insider trading, why should insider trading affect their confidence in the securities
markets?").
148. Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 801, 808 (1980).
149. Cf Krawiec, supra note 142, at 465 (discussing notion of "informational egalitarianism"
as fairness-based justification for prohibiting insider trading).
150. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INSIDER TRADING: A
COMPREHENSIVE PRIMER 65 (2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstract-id=26
1277 ("The 'correct' price of a security is that which would be set by the market if all the infor-
mation relating to the security had been publicly disclosed").
151. See id. at 66 (citing HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 77-91
(1966)).
152. As noted id. at 66 n.227, further discussion of the signaling effect may be found in Wil-
liam J. Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863 (1987);
Dennis S. Corgill, Insider Trading, Price Signals, and Noisy Information, 71 IND. L.J. 355 (1996);
Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J.
977 (1992)).
153. E.g., Robert A. Prentice & Dain C. Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device, 47
AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (2010); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1443
(1967).
154. For a discussion of this Article's proposed solution, see infra Part IV.
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delayed blockholder disclosure that must be weighed when setting
regulatory policy.
2. Depriving Counterparties of Autonomy
The foregoing discussion took a strict consequentialist approach,
i.e., measuring the costs of delayed blockholder disclosure solely by its
effects on society as a whole. But there is another source of non-eco-
nomic costs imposed by the ten-day window: the loss of autonomy
inherent in inducing a counterparty to trade on a deceptive premise.
In an article in the Columbia Business Law Review, Ian B. Lee justi-
fies the prohibition on insider trading on deontological grounds.ss
Unlike the "emotion and empty assertion"1 56 that characterized the
debate over insider trading prior to Henry Manne's economic argu-
ment in favor of legalization," Lee develops a rigorous philosophical
theory of fairness in markets based on respecting the autonomy of
market participants. 5 1 In his view, in a fair market, the law should
seek to promote the respect of autonomy between trading counterpar-
ties.159 Under this rationale, Lee justifies the traditional legal prohibi-
tion on coercion and deception,16 0 e.g., contracts made under duress
or fraud. With respect to trading on asymmetric information, Lee
argues:
If information improves a party's options, it does so in a way that goes
to the quality of the decision as an exercise of autonomy: it strength-
ens the connection between the decision and the eventual outcomes.
The closer the connection, the more the decision can be said to relate
to the eventual outcome itself. Conversely, the less informed the deci-
sion, the weaker the connection between the decision and the out-
comes and the more attenuated the decision-maker's autonomy.161
Withholding material information that is beneficial to counterparties
undermines their autonomy by denying them the opportunity to
"make their choice more autonomous and the transaction, therefore,
more successful."162 Accordingly, since securities regulation should
promote fair markets, it should prohibit any trading "while in posses-
155. Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 119, 141-42, 149
(2002).
156. Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Trading: A Contractual Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 269, 289 (1999).
157. Bainbridge, supra note 149, at 66; MANNE, supra note 151.
158. See Lee, supra note 155.
159. Id. at 146-47 ("In a fair market, each participant treats the values of neutrality and
autonomy not simply as values to which he or she alone is entitled, but as values which are to be
respected equally for all those with whom he or she trades.").
160. Id. at 147.
161. Id. at 152-53.
162. Id. at 157.
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sion of nonpublic information that would affect the investment deci-
sions of other market participants."' 6 3
This analysis is not limited to doctrinal insider trading. Any trading
on asymmetric information deprives counterparties of autonomy by
misleading them regarding the nature of their transaction. The com-
pany no longer has beneficial ownership x but rather x+h, with hedge
fund h as a substantial blockholder having a control intent (as evi-
denced by the future filing of schedule 13D rather than 13G). Moreo-
ver, the hedge fund is not merely withholding this information. It is
directly thwarting its trading partner's success by depriving him or her
of the voluntary choice to wait until the public announcement or de-
mand a higher price in light of the expected premium. Trading on
asymmetric information regarding beneficial ownership during the
ten-day window undermines counterparties' autonomy and frustrates
their ability to realize a successful transaction by deceitfully capturing
the profit they would have received with disclosure.
Some might object that by participating in a market that permits
trading on asymmetric information, sellers have voluntarily accepted
the risk of losing this profit to blockholders engaging in a stealth ac-
cumulation. Under this view, there is no autonomy violation because
sellers implicitly waived any moral right to receive all material infor-
mation by voluntarily participating in a market that permits trading on
asymmetric information. But this critique assumes too much: partici-
pation in a market that legally sanctions trading on asymmetric infor-
mation does not imply a subjective waiver of the moral entitlement to
making a fully informed decision with all material information.
To make this point clearer, it is helpful to consider the response of
Professor Jules Coleman to Richard Posner's claim that voluntary par-
ticipation in a market with known risks constitutes consent to losses
resulting from such risks-in Posner's words: "[I]f you buy a lottery
ticket and lose the lottery, then, so long as there is no question of
fraud or duress, you have consented to the loss."164 Coleman's reply
is instructive:
If I buy the lottery ticket and lose my loss may be a fair or legitimate
one, one that it may be appropriate to pin on me. It would be fair
because I had willingly taken a risk by consenting to or voluntarily
joining an enterprise that was risky in the relevant way. But it would
hardly follow that I had consented to the loss. Consenting to or taking
163. Id.
164. Richard Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 492 (1980).
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the risk is not equivalent to consenting to or taking the loss, irrespective
of the fairness of the loss.165
Positive contract law might doctrinally impute such consent unless a
seller specifically opts out in the contract of sale. But moral harm is
distinct from legal liability. A fair market that upholds the autonomy
of trading participants should presume that counterparties are morally
entitled to make decisions with the highest possible degree of auton-
omy, i.e., with disclosure of all material information held by
counterparties.
This moral entitlement is not waived because a market legally per-
mits exploitation of information asymmetries. The legal status quo is
merely descriptive, and only supplies the weakest implications regard-
ing a seller's subjective intent regarding full disclosure. Consider the
example of a seller who insists on full disclosure yet trades (unknow-
ingly) during the ten-day window. In light of the seller's affirmative
statement that he or she has not waived the moral expectation of re-
ceiving all material information, it would be difficult to conclude that
the sale transaction invalidates this explicit expression of will. The law
may not fully honor the seller's autonomy-i.e., by giving the buyer
the right to trade without disclosing its accumulated stake-but that
does not imply that the seller has voluntarily waived his or her moral
entitlement to make a fully informed decision. This analysis is not
limited to express objections: in a fair market that upholds
counterparties' autonomy, an insistence on full disclosure of all mate-
rial information should be the default rule. Unless a seller expressly
waives his or her moral entitlement to a fully informed decision, trad-
ing on asymmetric information deprives such a seller of some degree
of autonomy and thereby causes moral injury.
At its core, this moral argument reflects the fundamental notion
that mere participation in a market does not inherently constitute a
waiver of moral entitlements that should be protected by the legal
system-at least in the form of a default rule or, as suggested in this
article, through imposition of a fee and redistribution. This is, in es-
sence, a limit on the extent of "implied consent," which long been
recognized in the field of bioethics. 166 In the words of one scholar
discussing the widely accepted Belmont Report on ethics in medical
research:
165. Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509,
535-36 (1980) (emphasis added).
166. Sigurdur Kristinsson, Autonomy and Informed Consent, 10 MEDICINE, HEALT I CARE
& PHIL. 253, 253 (2007) ("For decades, the greater part of efforts to improve regulatory
frameworks for research ethics has focused on informed consent procedures; their design, codifi-
cation and regulation.").
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Informed consent is widely regarded as a key component in the ethics
of research involving human subjects .... Would subjects be respected
as persons if their consent to participation in databank research was
merely presumed, for example? An opt-out clause would seem to pro-
vide most people an opportunity to choose whether or not to partici-
pate, but this would be a far cry from common standards for informed
consent. Would it nevertheless be adequate? The [Belmont] report
implies that it would not. In addition to choice, potential research
subjects need to be given "adequate information", in order to be
treated respectfully as persons.' 6 7
Indeed, this rationale is equally applicable to market transactions.
In addition to respect for autonomy, the requirement of explicit in-
formed consent reflects fundamental notions of distributive justice.
One might wonder why the traditional market mechanism of "shop-
ping" is insufficient in this context: if investors are dissatisfied with the
level of disclosure provided by one capital market, they can volunta-
rily migrate to an alternative and thereby apply competitive pressure
to bring about the desired disclosure. However, offering different
levels of respect for autonomy "for sale" to the highest bidder would
have profound distributive implications. It would be unthinkable to
adopt such an approach for medicine, wherein only private doctors
would supply adequate information regarding the implications of
medical procedures in response to demand by wealthy patients. In-
deed, a commitment to fairness alongside autonomy demands that the
law uphold mandatory disclosure for all market participants, including
those who lack the wealth to compel disclosure by a market
transaction.
This does not imply that hedge funds or other market participants
are morally obligated to disclose subjective intent, future plans, or
nonmaterial information. These are not necessary for a fully reflec-
tive, autonomy-honoring decision by sellers to trade while
blockholders engage in a stealth accumulation. But delayed
blockholder disclosure permits a market participant to intentionally
withhold objective information regarding its share accumulation,
knowing that disclosure would have affected its counterparty's trading
decision, and then to profit by tacitly misleading him or her. In the
case of J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands, such non-disclosure led to
nearly $300 million in deceptively induced profits.1 68 Such exploita-
167. Id. Interestingly, Kristinsson disagrees that autonomy can justify informed consent on
its own, opining that "the moral purpose of informed consent" is "respect for rational agents"
rather than autonomy. Id. at 261. However, as Kristinsson acknowledges, this contradicts the
accepted view which views respect for autonomy as the motivating rationale. Regardless of the
analytical justification, Kristinsson reaches the same conclusion that informed consent is justi-
fied. See id. at 261-62.
168. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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tion of trading counterparties undermines the mutual respect for au-
tonomy that lies at the core of a fair market.
Nonetheless, this moral harm does not mean that delayed disclosure
should be absolutely prohibited. As Lee acknowledges, there may be
economic justifications for permitting this moral harm in certain cir-
cumstances. 169 Indeed, he arguably brushes aside bargained-for opt-
out far too quickly, 170 as express waiver of the right to receive all ma-
terial information would fully respect the seller's autonomy. But in
the absence of such express opt-out, there is moral harm from delayed
disclosure that must be weighed alongside the benefits of hedge fund
activism. It is not enough to consider only one half of the equation.
IV. PRIVATE ORDERING, FEES AND COMPENSATION
This Part shows why a single mandatory disclosure duration is
suboptimal and suggests a private ordering approach that would facili-
tate efficiently determining the optimal disclosure length for each
firm. This Part also proposes imposing a filing fee to internalize the
social cost of delayed disclosure and a compensation regime to ame-
liorate the injury to victims of trading on asymmetric information.
A. WHY A SINGLE MANDATORY DISCLOSURE DURATION IS
SUBOPTIMAL
The suboptimal nature of the current ten-day window is simple to
grasp intuitively. 171 Consider two firms, A and B, with the following
hypothetical total and marginal firm-specific costs and benefits from
different levels of blockholder disclosure:
169. Lee, supra note 155, at 189.
170. See id. at 187.
171. The Appendix contains a simple model and discussion of additional problems of statisti-
cal inference that further demonstrate the challenge with finding an optimal, one-size-fits-all
mandatory disclosure duration.
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The upper curves reflect a firm's total cost and benefit from
blockholder disclosure and the lower curves reflect a firm's marginal
cost and benefit, i.e., the cost or benefit from one additional day of
delayed disclosure. These graphs reflect the intuitive assumption that
marginal costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure are gen-
erally positive-i.e., hedge funds obtain a greater benefit for each ad-
ditional day of disclosure, which imposes an increasing cost on firms
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as well.17 2 These graphs demonstrate that the optimal duration for
each firm is the number of days that maximizes the difference be-
tween the total cost and benefit curves when the benefit exceeds the
cost. Put differently, the optimal duration is the number of days
where the marginal benefit from one additional day of disclosure
equals its marginal cost.
These examples demonstrate that a universal mandatory
blockholder disclosure duration is suboptimal because it is over- and
under-inclusive. For example, consider a duration of 5 days. For firms
like firm A, this would be nearly optimal. For firms like firm B, it
would be much less optimal than a shorter duration, e.g., 2 days.
More generally, for some firms, the benefit from monitoring and disci-
plining management at a shorter duration would exceed the costs of
short-termism. For others, this duration would encourage excessive
hedge fund activism, imposing costs that exceed the benefits to those
firms.
The costs and benefits of hedge fund activism may vary between
firms for idiosyncratic, firm-specific reasons. Certain companies may
be more vulnerable to managerial slack than others. A particularly
charismatic CEO recruited externally may be given greater leniency
by the board of directors-and thus have greater potential for subop-
timal performance-than a management team promoted from within
on a provisional basis. Conversely, hedge fund activism may be more
likely to induce short-termism at certain firms if management had pre-
viously had a challenging experience with dissatisfied activist
shareholders.
One factor common to all firms that affects the costs and benefits of
hedge fund activism is the degree of antitakeover measures that a firm
had adopted. In general, the value of one form of shareholder activ-
ism depends on the ease at which other forms of activism may be al-
ternatively employed to reduce managerial slack. Antitakeover
measures, such as poison pills and classified boards, make it harder to
reduce managerial slack through the threat of a hostile takeover.17 3
When strong takeover defenses are present, hedge fund activism could
provide a firm with a greater benefit because it may be one of the few
remaining means of disciplining management.
Conversely, when takeover defenses are weak or absent, hedge
fund activism may exacerbate management's vulnerability to aggres-
172. The benefit curve for Firm B demonstrates another possibility, namely that the benefit
starts decreasing after a certain point in time, i.e., if activism would not be more beneficial for
the firm if the hedge fund had an additional day of delayed disclosure.
173. For a discussion of how takeovers reduce managerial slack, see generally Michael Jen-
sen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP., winter 1988, at.21 (1988);
David Scharfstein, The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers, 55 REV. ECON. STUD. 185 (1988).
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sive, activist shareholders seeking to maximize short-term profits. Ac-
cordingly, the level of antitakeover provisions may directly determine
the costs and benefits of hedge fund activism for a given firm. This is
why a private ordering solution for delayed blockholder disclosure
would be a particularly effective approach: the shareholders of each
firm are best suited to choose the duration that preserves managerial
discipline while avoiding excessive short-termism in light of the firm's
existing antitakeover provisions.
Interestingly, there is a current trend among public companies to-
wards reducing takeover defenses, particularly classified boards.1 74
Efforts by the Harvard Law School's Shareholders Rights Project and
the American Corporate Governance Institute led to board declassifi-
cation among 21 S&P 500 companies in 2011.1" In its 2012 proxy vot-
ing summary guidelines, the influential Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) recommends that institutional shareholders vote
against director nominees who adopt long-term poison pills or refuse
to declassify boards following shareholder approval of non-binding
proposals seeking such action. 17 6 This trend towards reducing an-
titakeover defenses suggests that shortening the blockholder disclo-
sure window might be particularly beneficial to target firms,
increasing the likelihood that a majority of firms will prefer a default
rule of immediate disclosure, as explained below.177
The following two Sections propose specific regulatory reforms to
implement a private ordering solution for blockholder disclosure in
light of the varying firm-specific and social costs of hedge fund
activism.
B. PRIVATE ORDERING FOR FIRM-SPECIFIC DELAYED DISCLOSURE
This Section proposes a private ordering solution to setting the opti-
mal length for the blockholder disclosure window. 178 In short, the
SEC should adopt a default rule of immediate disclosure or disclosure
174. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Contributing to the Declassification of21 S&P 500 Com-
panies: Final Tally of the Results of the ACGIs 2011 Work, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
Gov. & FIN. REG. (Oct. 23, 2012, 9:16 AM), http://blogs.1aw.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/10/23/
contributing-to-the-declassification-of-21-sp-500-companies-final-tally-of-the-results-of-the-ac-
gis-2011-work/#1.
175. Id.
176. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2012 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY GUIDE-
LINES 11-12 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/2012USSummary
Guidelines.pdf.
177. See discussion infra p. 52-53.
178. Steven Brams and I have argued elsewhere that even a private ordering approach is
economically inferior to a negotiated transaction facilitated by a bargaining mechanism. Steven
J. Brams & Joshua Mitts, Law and Mechanism Design: Procedures to Induce Honest Bargaining,
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=
2161045. However, such an approach is a significant departure from the status quo and would
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within one day of acquiring the requisite beneficial ownership, but
permit individual corporations to opt-out of this rule through a share-
holder amendment to the corporate bylaws. Such an amendment
could authorize a longer disclosure window up to the statutory maxi-
mum of ten days. A shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws
would give shareholders the opportunity to maximize the value of
their shares if a longer duration for blockholder disclosure would in
fact do so.
1. Private Ordering: Background and Proxy Access
The notion that the securities laws should contain default rather
than mandatory disclosure rules is hardly new. As early as 1978, the
mandatory disclosure requirements of the Williams Act were criti-
cized for "dilut[ing] the value of the property right in privately pro-
duced information.""17  In 1987, Jonathan R. Macey and Jeffrey M.
Netter argued that the mandatory disclosure requirements of takeover
intent under regulation 13D were unnecessary and socially detrimen-
tal by deterring bidders and should be replaced by an optional amend-
ment to a company's articles of incorporation.18 0
More recently, scholars have advocated competition between juris-
dictions to permit firms to gravitate to more efficient securities law
regimes.1 81 In the same line, Ian Ayres and Steven Choi suggest regu-
lating so-called "outsider trading" by permitting the traded firm to
elect to prohibit trading in its shares by informed outsiders such as
market analysts. 182 The approach taken by Ayres and Choi is similar
to this Article, as they argue for a firm-specific opt-out requiring ap-
proval by "both a majority of a firm's board and a majority of a firm's
shareholders." 8 3  This Article makes a similar opt-out argument:
require substantial legislative reform. The private ordering solution proposed here can be imple-
mented under the existing statute by administrative rulemaking. See discussion infra p. 51.
179. Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control,
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. RLv. 1, 13 (1978). See also William J.
Carney, Toward a More Perfect Market for Corporate Control, 9 DiEL. J. CORP. L. 593, 597 (1984)
(criticizing mandatory disclosure of takeover intentions).
180. Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65
WASH. U. L.Q. 131, 154 (1987) ("Interestingly, no one has ever explained why target firms could
not themselves provide incentives for bidders to disclose the information required by the Wil-
liams Act if such disclosure would benefit shareholders. If shareholders of potential target firms
find such information of value, they could make appropriate adjustments in their firms' articles
of incorporation that would require the disclosure.").
181. E.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the Inter-
national Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 914 (1998); Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2402
(1998).
182. Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313, 389
(2002).
183. Id.
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delayed blockholder disclosure should be permitted on a firm-specific
basis through a shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws.s 4
Indeed, Luca Enriques, Matteo Gargantini, and Valerio Novembre
advocated a similar approach in the European context, suggesting
shareholder disclosure opt-out by both issuers and Member States.1 s5
In the economic analysis above, adopting a private ordering ap-
proach is akin to recognizing that no external regulator can find the
firm-specific optimal disclosure length better than the firm's share-
holders. They have a natural incentive to maximize the benefit from
delayed disclosure-i.e., encouraging hedge fund activism to monitor
and discipline management-while minimizing the costs of such
delayed disclosure-i.e., an excessive focus on short-termism which
would depress the long-term value of their shares.
Admittedly, this approach assumes the group of shareholders re-
quired to approve the bylaws amendment are seeking to maximize
long-term value. It would obviously not apply when a majority of a
company's shares are held by investors who themselves have a short-
term orientation. One way to prevent a simple reversal of the disclo-
sure duration window is to require a supermajority for future amend-
ments. 1 8 6 Yet in the vast majority of cases, empowering shareholders
to opt-out of immediate disclosure would encourage determination of
the efficient firm-specific blockholder disclosure window duration.
Interestingly, a private ordering approach to proxy access was
widely advocated in the debate over the SEC's now-defunct Rule 14a-
11. As proposed, Rule 14a-11 would have required the inclusion of
shareholders' director nominations in a reporting company's proxy
materials.18 7 Leading corporate law firms and industry groups, includ-
ing Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP
and the Business Roundtable, advocated permitting firms to opt-out
of these requirements through an amendment to the corporate by-
laws. 88 This position was echoed by academic scholars, including Lu-
184. Unlike Ayres and Choi, this Article advocates for approval of an amendment to the
bylaws by shareholders alone. See discussion infra p. 54.
185. Luca Enriques, Matteo Gargantini & Valerio Novembre, Mandatory and Contract-
Based Shareholding Disclosure, 25 UNiF. L. REV. 713, 736 (2010).
186. See discussion infra p. 56.
187. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9046, 34-
60089, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024-01 passin (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 200,
232, 240, 249, and 274).
188. E.g., Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n 10 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-
263.pdf; Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Eaton Corp., and
Chair, Corp. Leadership Initiative, Bus. Roundtable, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n 47 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-
267.pdf; Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al. to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec.
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cian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst,189 who advocated an opt-out regime
with a default rule permitting proxy access.190 A broader argument
was advanced by D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright and Marcus Kai
Hintze, who advocated private ordering through shareholder amend-
ments to corporate bylaws more generally.!9 1
In Business Roundtable v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit struck down Rule
14a-11, the final version of which did not contain a private ordering
exception.1 92 But the changes to Rule 14a-8 remained untouched by
this decision, which give shareholders the ability to propose bylaws
addressing election-related matters. 1 93 In essence, the current regime
is a de facto private ordering system where shareholders may effect
changes to election procedures by proposing amendments to the by-
laws in a company's proxy statement.1 9 4 Accordingly, this Article's
private ordering proposal is not without precedent, nor is it far re-
moved from positions previously advocated by practitioners and the
academic community.
2. Implementing Private Ordering for Blockholder Disclosure
A private ordering solution to blockholder disclosure consists of (1)
replacing the current mandatory rule of a ten-day window with a de-
fault rule of immediate disclosure and (2) instituting an opt-out proce-
dure. These two reforms could be implemented by a legislative rule
within the SEC's existing authority under the Dodd-Frank Act. 195
Section 929R does not proscribe any limitation on the SEC's rulemak-
& Exch. Comm'n 1-2 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/
s71009- 212.pdf.
189. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65
Bus. LAw. 329, 351-52 (2010).
190. Id.; see also Brett H. McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy Access,
43 Amz. ST. L.J. 67, 113-114 (2011) (making a similar argument to that of Bebchuk and Hirst).
191. D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with Share-
holder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 170 (2011). But see Brett H. McDonnell, "Private
Ordering" Taken a Tad Too Far, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. REs GESTAE 32, 32 (2011) (generally
supporting but criticizing portions of Smith, Wright & Hintze's proposals).
192. Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
193. See also McDonnell, supra note 190, at 36 ("For decades, the misbegotten 'relates to an
election' exclusion prevented shareholders from using Rule 14a-8 to propose bylaws setting the
rules for shareholder elections. The SEC's recent proxy access rules wisely eliminated this exclu-
sion (more or less), and the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC does
not change that.").
194. See id. ("Given the stringency of [the new Rule 14a-11], what really mattered was
amending Rule 14a-8 to allow shareholders to create their own more generous rules, and as
mentioned, that change remains in place."). But see Smith, Wright & Hintze, supra note 191, at
185 (discussing other limitations on proxy proposals in Rule 14a-8 and advocating their
elimination).
195. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203,
§ 929R, 124 Stat. 1376, 1866-67 (Jul. 21, 2010).
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ing authority other than a ten-day maximum but simply refers to
"such shorter time as the Commission may establish by rule." 19 6
Under the doctrine articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., administrative agencies are shown
considerable deference when interpreting an enabling statute.197 Con-
struing section 929R as permitting a firm-specific blockholder disclo-
sure duration would likely pass the first step of the Chevron analysis
for the validity of an agency interpretation of a statute because such
an interpretation is "unambiguously" implied by the statutory text.198
The text of section 929R simply refers to "such shorter time as the
Commission may establish by rule."199 A straightforward reading of
this text does not imply that the "time" must be universal and equal
for all firms. Accordingly, it is likely that an SEC interpretation of
section 929R as permitting a private ordering system would pass the
first step of Chevron.
Moreover, even if a court were to hold that this interpretation is not
"unambiguously" implied by the statute, a private ordering interpreta-
tion would almost certainly be upheld as a "permissible construction
of the statute."20 0 It is clearly not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute."2 0 1 There is no implication whatsoever in the
text of section 929R that the disclosure duration must be universal.
Accordingly, the SEC's interpretation would be "given controlling
weight."2 02
The default disclosure duration should be set as short as possible,
e.g., immediately, in order to compel shareholders to opt-out if they
wish to encourage hedge fund activism.20 3 The SEC should give effect
to congressional intent when interpreting the statute,2 04 and com-
ments by the House Committee on Financial Services indicate that the
196. Id.
197. Chevron, U.S., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
198. Id. at 843.
199. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929R, 124 Stat. at
1867.
200. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
201. Id. at 844.
202. Id.
203. If immediate disclosure is impractical, one day might be used. The feasibility of imme-
diate disclosure depends on whether the SEC and stock exchanges have the technical means to
detect intraday accumulation beyond the 5% threshold and can facilitate intraday reporting.
204. See generally CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 4 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 11:33 (3d ed.) ("Courts
... may be skeptical of an agency's reliance on legislative history as justification for an agency's
statutory interpretation.... [But g]enerally committee reports, particular reports from the con-
ference committee, can be helpful indicators of congressional intent."); Jerry L. Mashaw, Be-
tween Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U.
TORONTO L.J. 497, 509 (2005) ("In some instances only the skillful deployment of legislative
history will permit agencies to fulfill their constitutional role as faithful agents in the statute's
implementation.").
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purpose of section 929R is to reduce mispricing.2 0 5 If the SEC were to
retain the existing ten-day rule as a default rule, firms would be forced
to opt-out to impose a shorter duration on blockholders. As opt-out
requires reaching shareholder consensus-indeed, a supermajority
under this Article's proposal-such an approach would leave more
firms with the default ten-day rule. This would be less effective at
reducing mispricing and improving the information available in the
market than a default rule of immediate disclosure.
A default rule of immediate disclosure is justified under default-rule
theory as well. Much literature has discussed how the relationship be-
tween shareholders and the corporation can be analyzed as contrac-
tual.206  In a well-known article, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner
analyze "untailored defaults," where default rules are set according to
"what the majority of contracting parties would want." 2 0 7 These are
efficient when the gains to the parties for whom the default rule ful-
fills what they would have wanted exceed the loss to the parties who
incur the cost of contracting around the default.2 0 8
In the context of a private ordering approach to blockholder disclo-
sure, it is plausible that immediate disclosure would reflect what a ma-
jority of firms would prefer and the cost of contracting around this
default imposes losses less than the gains for firms that prefer a longer
duration. This is particularly likely in light of the current trend toward
declassifying boards and reducing antitakeover protections, which in-
creases the likelihood of inducing short-termism among target
firms.209
Admittedly, this is only an intuition. The SEC should conduct a
robust empirical study to determine how many firms would prefer a
default rule of immediate disclosure versus ten days and the cost of
opting-out of this default for those firms that prefer to do so. This
study may even provide empirical support for setting the default dura-
tion at some other length, e.g., five days, if that would produce gains
that exceeds losses under the Ayres and Gertner framework. None-
theless, it is likely that a majority of firms will prefer immediate disclo-
sure, and the legislative history in favor of reducing mispricing
suggests that a default rule of immediate disclosure is the right starting
point for regulatory reform.
205. H. Rep. No. 111-687, pt. 1, at 76 (2010).
206. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON
U. L. RFv. 99, 99 n.1 (1989) (collecting sources).
207. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic The-
ory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 90, 91 (1989).
208. See id. at 113-15. For these parties, an untailored default is a "penalty default" in Ayres
and Gertner's terminology. Id. at 97.
209. See discussion supra p. 46.
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It is essential to consider the precise mechanism for shareholders to
opt-out of the default rule of immediate disclosure. 2 1 0 For the SEC to
implement a private ordering system by administrative rule, this
mechanism should not require legislative reform. There are three pri-
mary possibilities to effectuate an opt-out under Delaware corporate
law: an amendment to the certificate of incorporation, a board of di-
rectors' amendment to the bylaws, or a shareholder amendment to the
bylaws. 2 11 For the following reasons, a shareholder amendment is the
best approach to effectuate a private ordering solution.
An amendment to a Delaware corporation's certificate of incorpo-
ration requires approval by the board of directors and a majority of
shareholders entitled to vote.2 12 Alternatively, a Delaware corpora-
tion may grant its board of directors the authority to amend the by-
laws.21 3 However, section 109 of the Delaware General Corporate
Law (DGCL) provides that shareholders always retain statutory au-
thority to amend the bylaws directly:
After a corporation . . . has received any payment for any of its stock,
the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockhold-
ers entitled to vote . . . . The fact that such power has been so con-
ferred upon the directors or governing body, as the case may be, shall
not divest the stockholders or members of the power, nor limit their
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.214
The fundamental reason for preferring a shareholder amendment to
the bylaws, as opposed to an amendment by the board of directors or
even an amendment to the certificate of incorporation, is that requir-
ing approval by the board of directors would undermine the effective-
ness of a private ordering solution to delayed blockholder disclosure.
By definition, the interests of shareholder activists are diametrically
opposed to some subset of existing management. Otherwise, these ac-
tivists would take a cooperative approach to effectuating corporate
change. In many cases, a solid majority of the board of directors may
oppose a particular shareholder activist's agenda.21 5
210. See generally, Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules,
121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012), for a comprehensive discussion of altering rules-for example, the
procedural rules of opt-out.
211. This analysis considers Delaware corporate law, as the vast majority of publicly traded
firms are incorporated there. Yet the principles would apply elsewhere if the appropriate techni-
cal adjustments are made.
212. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2010).
213. Id. at § 109(a) ("[A]ny corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors . . .
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, For Icahn, a Game of Chicken With Dell's Board, N.Y.
TIMEs DEALBOOK (Mar. 7, 2013) (discussing "game of chicken" between shareholder activist
Carl Ichan and the board of Dell Inc. which will "probably ignore his requests").
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These directors may genuinely have shareholders' best interests in
mind, although it is possible that directors may oppose hedge fund
activism simply to avoid being replaced.2 16 Yet the noncooperative
nature of the interaction between activist investors and existing man-
agement suggests that it is difficult to envision a board of directors
voting to extend the duration of the blockholder disclosure window,
even if it were in shareholders' best interest. More fundamentally, the
rationale for a private ordering system that encourages some level of
hedge fund activism is that such intervention ameliorates agency costs
between shareholders and management. This implies that the deci-
sion to permit delayed blockholder disclosure should rest with share-
holders alone.
The mechanics of implementing private ordering through a share-
holder amendment to the bylaws are straightforward.2 17 Under sec-
tion 109 of the DGCL, a majority of shareholders may approve an
amendment to the bylaws without the board's consent. 2 18 Technically,
this could be accomplished by a shareholder submitting a blockholder
disclosure opt-out proposal in the company's proxy statement for the
annual meeting of shareholders under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8.219
The amendment would simply state that the firm has elected to extend
the duration for reporting the acquisition of 5% or more of the benefi-
cial ownership of its shares by a certain number of days, up to the
statutory maximum of ten days.22 0
A shareholder amendment to the bylaws to facilitate private order-
ing for delayed blockholder disclosure would pass the test recently
articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME
216. Hedge fund activist Bill Ackman, for example, frequently agitates for a change in the
composition of a target firm's board of directors. See, e.g., Ben Dummet, Bill Ackman Riles
Canadians, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2012, at B6, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014
24052702304299304577347831092522236.html (describing Ackman's efforts to replace half the
board of Canadian Pacific Railway); Rachel Dodes, Penney to Give Activists a Say on Board,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2011, at Bl, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB0001424052748703
555804576101630964337152.html.
217. For a comprehensive discussion of private ordering through shareholder bylaws under
current Delaware law and proposals for reform, see generally Smith, Wright & Hintze, supra
note 191.
218. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a).
219. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). This rule consists of a series of questions and answers
regarding the requirements for submitting a shareholder proposal that a company must include
on its proxy statement.
220. There is no economic justification for capping the duration of a private ordering
blockholder disclosure window. However, the current statutory framework limits the duration
that the SEC could authorize to ten days. Section 929R of the Dodd-Frank Act only permits the
SEC to shorten, not lengthen, the disclosure period. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2012). If Congress
were to consider a statutory reform to section 13(d), it should remove this cap because the
benefits of blockholder disclosure may justify a longer period for certain firms. But if that is
infeasible, a private ordering solution capped at ten days could be implemented within the lan-
guage of the statute.
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Employees Pension Plan: "[A] proper function of bylaws is not to
mandate how the board should decide specific substantive business
decisions, but rather, to define the process and procedures by which
those decisions are made." 2 2 1 The duration of the blockholder disclo-
sure window does not relate to the substantive business decisions that
are reserved exclusively to the board of directors.2 2 2 It is rather a mat-
ter of process and procedure, specifically the point in time when a
blockholder must disclose his or her share accumulation under the se-
curities laws.
As noted previously, shareholders may wish to enshrine the
blockholder disclosure opt-out with a supermajority vote requirement
for any further amendment. Such a requirement would prevent subse-
quent modification by activist shareholders who may be able to obtain
sufficient support to reach a simple majority and thereby lengthen the
disclosure window for future prospective blockholders. Section 216 of
the DGCL provides that the "bylaws of any corporation authorized to
issue stock may specify the number of shares and/or the amount of
other securities having voting power . . . and the votes that shall be
necessary for, the transaction of any business." 2 23 Accordingly, cur-
rent shareholders may impose a supermajority requirement on future
amendments simply by including such a provision in the proposal for a
delayed blockholder disclosure amendment to the bylaws.
Finally, a shareholder amendment proposed through a public com-
pany's proxy statement would be a matter of public record.22 4 Moreo-
ver, a public company must file a form 8-K upon an amendment to its
bylaws. 2 25 Accordingly, prospective blockholders could easily discover
the delayed disclosure duration adopted by a shareholder amendment
to a firm's bylaws by examining a firm's proxy statement and 8-K
filings.
221. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234-35. (Del. 2008).
222. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.").
223. Id. at § 216(a). Section 216(a) also provides explicitly for the bylaws to impose a higher
shareholder vote threshold on non-director election matters: "In the absence of such specifica-
tion in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation . . . In all matters other than
the election of directors, the affirmative vote of the majority of shares present in person or
represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter shall be the act of
the stockholders .... ).
224. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a)(1) ("No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made
unless each person solicited is concurrently furnished or has previously been furnished with . ..
A publicly-filed preliminary or definitive proxy statement, in the form and manner described in
§ 240.14a-16, containing the information specified in Schedule 14A .... ) (emphasis added).
225. See 17 C.F.R. * 240.13a-11. 249.308.
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C. Internalizing the Social Cost of Delayed Blockholder Disclosure:
A Filing Fee and Compensation Proposal
1. A Sliding-Scale Filing Fee for Delayed Disclosure
To internalize the social cost of delayed blockholder disclosure, this
Section proposes imposing a fee on the acquisition of shares during
the delayed blockholder disclosure window.226 In other words, a
hedge fund that acquires greater than 5% ownership-i.e., by
purchasing shares of firms that have opted out of the default rule of
immediate disclosure, when such purchases occur during the period of
time authorized by the shareholder amendment to the bylaws-would
be required to pay a filing fee based on the social cost resulting from
the acquisition of these shares.
The computation of the delayed disclosure fee will be considered
shortly, but its mechanics are straightforward. The hedge fund would
pay the fee to the SEC when filing the schedule 13D, which already
contains several elements necessary to compute the fee: the number of
shares acquired and outstanding, percent of beneficial ownership ac-
quired, and the date at which the hedge fund crossed the 5% thresh-
old.2 27 The hedge fund would only be obligated to pay the fee for
acquiring ownership exceeding the 5% threshold. The hedge fund
would compute its total purchase price between the date of filing and
the date of reaching the 5% level, utilizing the existing trading data
currently reported in item 5(c) of schedule 13D.22 8 The hedge fund
could calculate the fee rate using a published table similar to Table 1
below based on the total purchase price, ownership acquired during
the delayed disclosure window, and the number of days between
crossing the 5% threshold and filing the 13D.
This approach envisions the delayed disclosure fee as a mandatory
payment for submitting a schedule 13D later than the date of acquir-
ing 5% beneficial ownership. While it would be a violation of the
226. From an economic standpoint, such a filing fee would function as a "Pigovian tax."
Pigou suggested forcing firms to pay for the social cost of harmful externalities as a means to
reduce output to the desired level. See, e.g., ARTHUR PIGou, THE EcoNoMICs 01 WELFARE
(1932).
227. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (listing the required elements of a schedule 13D filing,
including "Date of Event Which Requires Filing of This Statement," "Number of shares benefi-
cially owned by each reporting person," and "Percent of class represented by amount in Row
11"). The relevancy of this data is explained infra in the discussion of computation of the filing
fee.
228. See id. ("The description of a transaction required by Item 5(c) shall include, but not
necessarily be limited to: (1) The identity of the person covered by Item 5(c) who effected the
transaction; (2) the date of transaction; (3) the amount of securities involved; (4) the price per
share or unit; and (5) where and how the transaction was effected."). Hedge funds could simply
tabulate the average purchase price based on the transactions to be reported under item 5(c)
that occurred during the delayed disclosure window.
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securities laws to submit a schedule 13D after the period authorized
by the shareholder amendment to the firm's bylaws, the hedge fund
would not be obligated to wait until the conclusion of the authorized
period. This is precisely why ascertaining the social cost of delayed
disclosure is such an important responsibility for a regulator looking
out for the public good: regardless of the specific durations that indi-
vidual firms authorize, the delayed disclosure fee will compel hedge
funds to internalize the social cost of trading on asymmetric
information.
Similar to the private ordering system, the SEC likely could enact
the delayed disclosure fee by administrative rule without statutory re-
form. The SEC's authority to shorten the disclosure window is deline-
ated by language referring solely to the duration of the window:
"within such shorter time as the Commission may establish by rule."2 2 9
However, unlike an agency interpretation that the duration may be set
on a firm-specific basis, the imposition of a mandatory payment in
exchange for a longer duration does not relate strictly to "estab-
lish[ing]" a "shorter time." Accordingly, a rule imposing a delayed
disclosure fee could not be upheld under the first step of the Chevron
test for the validity of an agency interpretation of a statute because
Congress has not "directly spoken to the precise question at issue."23 0
Authority to impose a delayed disclosure fee is not "unambiguously"
implied by the statutory text.23 '
However, a delayed disclosure fee would likely be upheld under the
second step of the Chevron test as a "permissible construction of the
statute."2 3 2 Because a rule enacting a delayed disclosure fee would be
promulgated under an express delegation of authority by Congress,
such a regulation would be "given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 2 3 3 A rule
providing for a delayed disclosure fee would not likely be arbitrary or
capricious, which requires a showing that the SEC:
[H]as relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
229. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1). (emphasis added).
230. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
231. Id. at 843.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 844; see, e.g., NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. U.S., 368 F.3d 1369, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (applying second prong of Chevron test and affirming the Department of Commerce's
construction of a statute because it is "neither arbitrary, capricious, nor manifestly contrary to
the statute").
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before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to
a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.234
As long as the SEC weighs all of the available alternatives, it would
pass arbitrariness review. A delayed disclosure fee would be rational
to institute based on the considerations outlined in this Article.
In addition, a delayed disclosure fee would not be considered "man-
ifestly contrary to the statute." The language of section 929R of the
Dodd-Frank Act does not limit the means by which the SEC may
shorten the disclosure period. Indeed, enacting a financial hurdle to
delayed disclosure is one method by which the SEC can bring about a
"shorter time" for disclosure. Moreover, the House Committee on
Financial Services report on section 929R-plainly appropriate to
consult in Chevron step two2 3 5 -Supports the conclusion that the
SEC's authority is not limited solely to shortening reporting
timeframes: "This section provides the SEC with the authority to
adopt rules to shorten reporting timeframes and help the markets re-
ceive more timely information concerning substantial ownership inter-
ests in issuers. This change is important for purposes of obtaining
more accurate pricing of listed securities." 236 The italicized text indi-
cates a broader congressional intent than simply shortening the disclo-
sure period. A delayed disclosure fee would further the purpose of
obtaining "more accurate pricing of listed securities" by penalizing de-
lays that cause prices to diverge from what they would be if the hedge
fund's accumulated ownership were known to the market.
From an economic standpoint, a delayed disclosure fee would func-
tion as a "nonlinear corrective tax" where the rate is set equal to
harm, which Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have shown is a more
efficient means of addressing externalities than linear taxes or quan-
tity regulation.23 7 A nonlinear delayed disclosure fee would operate
on both the price and quantity terms by increasing the rate with the
proportion of accumulated ownership.2 38 The precise rates would be
set according to the proportional social harm caused by a given hedge
fund trading on asymmetric information during the delayed disclosure
window.
234. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Def.'s of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983)).
235. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-66; Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704-07 (1995).
236. H.R. Rep. No. 111-687, at 76 (2010). (emphasis added).
237. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity
Regulation, 4 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 4-5 (2002).
238. For a discussion of internalizing social externalities utilizing price and quantity regula-
tion, see generally Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781 (1996).
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set equal to these percentages, as given by the following example table
of rates:240
TABLE 1: HEURISTIc EXAMPLE OF DELAYED
DISCLOSURE FEE RATES
Days % of Ownership Acquired During Delayed Disclosure Period
0-2% 2-3% 3-4% 451% 5-6% 6-7% 7-8% 8-2% 9-10% 10+%
1 0.05% 0.13% 0.25% 0.43% 0.65% 0.93% 1.25% 1.63% 2.05% 2.53%
2 0.13% 0.20% 0.33% 0.50% 0.73% 1.00% 1.33% 1.70% 2.13% 2.60%
3 0.25% 0.33% 0.45% 0.63% 0.85% 1.13% 1.45% 1.83% 2.25% 2.73%
4 0.43% 0.50% 0.63% 0.80% 1.03% 1.30% 1.63% 2.00% 2.43% 2.90%
5 0.65% 0.73% 0.85% 1.03% 1.25% 1.53% 1.85% 2.23% 2.65% 3.13%
6 0.93% 1.00% 1.13% 1.30% 1.53% 1.80% 2.13% 2.50% 2.93% 3.40%
7 1.25% 1.33% 1.45% 1.63% 1.85% 2.13% 2.45% 2.83% 3.25% 3.73%
8 1.63% 1.70% 1.83% 2.00% 2.23% 2.50% 2.83% 3.20% 3.63% 4.10%
9 2.05% 2.13% 2.25% 2.43% 2.65% 2.93% 3.25% 3.63% 4.05% 4.53%
10 2.53% 2.60% 2.73% 2.90% 3.13% 3.40% 3.73% 4.10% 4.53% 5.00%
For example, a hedge fund that obtains a total of 1,000,000 shares dur-
ing the delayed disclosure period of a firm with 20,000,000 shares out-
standing over five days of delayed disclosure would be required to pay
a filing fee equal to 1.25% of the total purchase price.2 41 At an aver-
age purchase price of $10 per share, the filing fee would be approxi-
mately $125,000.242
This is just a heuristic example of a hypothetical social cost of
delayed disclosure.243 But it demonstrates how a nonlinear corrective
fee might be imposed according to the social harm brought about by
delayed blockholder disclosure. In this example, the social cost and
fee rate are a quadratic function of the number of days and the per-
centage of ownership acquired, scaled to a maximum rate of 5 %.244
240. Both the graph and the table utilize a simple formula for calculating this example. The
fee rate is equal to the number of days squared, multiplied by 0.10/100. The latter term scales
the rate to a maximum of 10% for ten days.
241. 1,000,000 shares out of 20,000,000 shares outstanding = 5% of the outstanding shares.
According to Table 1, if 5% of the outstanding shares are acquired over 5 days of delayed disclo-
sure, the fee would be to 1.25% of the purchase price.
242. The calculation is as follows: 1,000,000 shares acquired x $10/share x 1.25% fee =
$125,000.
243. A method of approximating the actual social cost will be considered shortly.
244. A maximum rate of 5% was chosen as the median abnormal return to hedge fund activ-
ism within a (-20, 20) event day window found by Bray et al. was 5.6%. Bray et al., supra note
103, at 1756. This is not an argument for setting the fee equal to hedge funds' median returns,
but simply serves as a useful initial heuristic approximation of the maximum social cost that
delayed disclosure might bring about. The maximum fee rate is not set to 100% because the
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Applying this example to the acquisition of J.C. Penney by Pershing
Square and Vornado Realty Trust indicates that the delayed disclosure
filing fee on the acquisitions during the ten-day window would be
$37,135,864 and $6,002,398, respectively.24 5 These are far lower than
the actual potential profits the hedge funds obtained, suggesting that
the fee would not have prevented activism in this instance. But it
would have reduced the payoff of intervention and forced these hedge
funds to internalize the approximate social cost of trading on asym-
metric information during the delayed disclosure window.
Of course, the discussion thus far has only been a hypothetical ex-
ample of how a nonlinear delayed disclosure fee might operate. A
greater challenge is to determine the correct rates, i.e., the empirical
distribution of social cost resulting from delayed disclosure at differ-
ent durations. Initially, a quadratic function might be utilized, under
the intuition that distrust in capital markets would become substan-
tially worse for each additional day of delayed disclosure and each
additional percent of ownership acquired. But it is also essential to
ascertain the more specific characteristics of the distribution of the
social cost of delayed blockholder disclosure. This cost may be dis-
continuous. Certain levels of delayed disclosure may lead to a jump in
distrust of capital markets. Accordingly, setting the fee rates with a
quadratic function should only be a rough initial approximation.
Finding the empirical social cost of delayed disclosure can be ac-
complished through a continual process of surveying and experimen-
tation. The SEC might, for example, randomly survey market makers
and individual investors upon the filing of a schedule 13D as to how
the stealth acquisition of shares during delayed disclosure window af-
fected bid/ask spreads and their participation in the market. 2 4 6 The
SEC could compare trading patterns of individual investors who had
traded with a stealth acquirer to those who had not. A well-designed
purpose of the filing fee is not to fully compensate victims of asymmetric trading but rather to
induce a socially optimal level of hedge fund activism. Imposing a fee equal to 100% of a hedge
fund's acquisition during the delayed disclosure window would render such purchases cost-pro-
hibitive unless the hedge fund expected to obtain at least a 100% profit on the acquisition of
these shares plus the initial 5% block acquired at a discount. This is a high hurdle to cross. The
funds from a lower delayed disclosure fee would partially compensate victims under the compen-
sation scheme described in the next Subsection, but the primary goal of the filing fee is to induce
the socially optimal level of activism.
245. The calculation is as follows. Pershing Square acquired 10.2% of J.C. Penney over a
period of 10 days at a total purchase price of $742,717,279 (treating options as equal to the
purchase price plus strike price and cash-settled total return swaps as equal to purchasing the
underlying equity) * fee rate of 5% = $37,135,864. Vornado acquired 3.3% of J.C. Penney over a
period of 10 days at a total purchase price of $219,868,049 (treating options as with Pershing
Square and forwards at the initial reference price) * 2.73% = $6,002,398.
246. For a discussion of the use of randomization to set legal and regulatory policy, see gen-
erally Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
929 (2011).
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empirical study could reveal much about the social cost of delayed
disclosure.247
2. Compensating Victims of Delayed Disclosure
As described above, there are two primary sources of social cost
imposed by delayed blockholder disclosure-one consequentialist and
the other deontological. It is essential to recognize at the outset that
any efficient mechanism to internalize the social cost of delayed dis-
closure can necessarily only address these two sources imperfectly.
On the consequentialist level, it may be impossible to ensure that in-
vestors who sell shares to hedge funds trading on asymmetric informa-
tion will be fully compensated while still preserving an efficient level
of hedge fund activism. This is because the pursuit of efficiency re-
quires incentivizing the level of hedge fund activism that is optimal for
a firm and society as a whole, even if that means transferring wealth
from selling shareholders to the acquiring hedge fund.
In other words, a relatively short disclosure delay may be optimal
for firms and society as a whole, but it may still impose losses on trad-
ing counterparties that exceed any amount that can be internalized
while still retaining an efficient level of activism. On the deontologi-
cal level, it may be that no monetary compensation can adequately
remedy the injury to counterparties' autonomy.
Nonetheless, a compensation system should be instituted to amelio-
rate the injury to victims of trading on asymmetric information. This
could be accomplished by establishing a dedicated fund to which the
proceeds of the delayed disclosure fee would be directed. Individuals
or firms who sold shares during the delayed disclosure period prior to
a blockholder's schedule 13D announcement and during the number
of days authorized by the private ordering amendment to the com-
pany's bylaws would be eligible to receive compensation for their
losses.
The mechanics of the compensation system are straightforward. An
investor's "loss" should be defined as the difference between the in-
vestor's sale price during the delayed disclosure window and the clos-
ing price on the first trading day following the schedule 13D filing.24 8
247. However, as discussed in the Appendix, finding a single optimal mandatory disclosure
length for the distribution of the firm-specific costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclo-
sure is extraordinarily difficult.
248. The closing price on the day after disclosure is more preferable than a later date, e.g.,
the ten-day post-disclosure closing price that was used to demonstrate a hedge fund's potential
profit in Section II.A. Investors could presumably sell immediately upon the schedule 13D an-
nouncement to benefit from the higher share price, whereas the hedge fund could not realisti-
cally sell its entire stake on the day of disclosure (thus making a ten-day period a more
reasonable comparison).
2013] 253
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As administrator of the compensation scheme, the SEC could reduce
an investor's loss if there is objective evidence that the sale price or
the closing price on the day of disclosure was depressed or inflated by
some other, unrelated event such as a poor earnings announcement or
sharp decline in the firm's sector or market as a whole.24 9
An investor's "loss" would serve as a benchmark for a proportional
allocation of the funds available in the compensation fund on a peri-
odic basis. If the total aggregate losses among investors in a given
period (e.g. tax year) are equal to or less than the funds available in
the compensation fund, every investor will receive full compensation
for his or her losses. In the more likely scenario where the aggregate
losses exceed the available funds, each investor will receive a propor-
tion of the available funds equal to his or her proportion of the total
losses. For example, if aggregate losses total $1 million of which an
investor has lost $100,000, but the available funds in the compensation
fund for that tax year equal $500,000, that investor would receive
$50,000.
This definition of "loss" is similar to the approach utilized in tradi-
tional securities litigation. Under Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
250 euiisfBroudo, in a securities fraud lawsuit "an inflated purchase price will
not itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic
loss."251 However, the Court emphasized, "[i]f the purchaser sells
later after the truth makes its way into the marketplace, an initially
inflated purchase price might mean a later loss."1252
The Court's statement in Dura reflects the rationale behind this Ar-
ticle's proposal to define an investor's "loss" from delayed
blockholder disclosure as the difference between the sale price and
the closing price on the date of the schedule 13D filing. An announce-
ment that a hedge fund has acquired over 5% of the beneficial owner-
ship of a reporting company is the disclosure of material information,
i.e., the "truth mak[ing] its way into the marketplace."253 The closing
price as of the day immediately after the 13D announcement most
likely reflects the effect of the disclosure on the share price rather
than other factors.
Permitting the SEC to adjust the "loss" calculation based on objec-
tive evidence that some other factor affected the share price either at
the time of sale or on the day of disclosure comports with the follow-
ing rationale articulated by the Court in Dura:
249. See discussion infra p. 67.
250. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
251. Id. at 342.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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When the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a lower
price, that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation,
but changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations,
new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events,
which taken separately or together account for some or all of that
lower price. 254
To the extent that an investor's loss was caused by some factor other
than delayed blockholder disclosure, it should not be compensable
under this compensation regime.25 5
Unlike with securities fraud, however, articulating a clear standard
for disproving causation in the delayed disclosure context is challeng-
ing. In Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., the Second Circuit held
that
"a plaintiff must allege .. . that the subject of the fraudulent statement
or omission was the cause of the actual loss suffered[.]"2 56 With
delayed blockholder disclosure, however, there is no specific "subject
of the fraudulent statement or omission" beyond the lack of filing a
schedule 13D prior to the moment of trading and the simultaneous
non-disclosure of the blockholder's accumulated stake. Accordingly,
while it is quite reasonable for the SEC to use the difference in the
closing price on the day of disclosure and the purchase price as a pre-
sumption of an investor's loss, it is difficult to identify a set of objec-
tive criteria that the SEC could employ to discount this sum in
response to other factors.
The most practicable solution is simply to entrust the SEC with the
discretion to adjust the claim by major firm-specific, sector, or market-
related developments, but otherwise to rely on the share price differ-
ential as a reasonable approximation of an investor's loss. Unlike
with securities fraud litigation, erring on the side of generally award-
ing investors "too much" would not lead to excessive recovery. Under
this proposal, the compensation system would apportion the available
funds according to investors' relative loss. As long as any error in
computing investors' losses is distributed similarly across investors,
this would not lead to any single investor receiving an excessive recov-
ery because the proportional shares for distributing the available
funds would remain identical.2 57
254. Id. at 342-43.
255. Admittedly, this would be difficult to establish in practice, but such an adjustment
should be provided to ensure that the compensation system is not being exploited to simply
insure against downturns in share prices.
256. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 95
(2d Cir. 2001)).
257. However, relative disparities between investors may still result under this proposal if
certain investors are able to make a greater loss claim because of external factors and the SEC
2013] 255
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Again, the purpose of this compensation system is not to fully rec-
ompense victims of trading with asymmetric information.258 From a
social welfare perspective, the pursuit of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-
producing gains to society that exceed losses-is normatively superior.
The fundamental goal of the filing fee proposal is to induce socially
efficient durations of delayed blockholder disclosure. However,
within this framework, it is possible to ameliorate the injury of infor-
mation asymmetries using a redistributive compensation system.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article's contribution is simple: in the debate over blockholder
disclosure, we have been asking the wrong questions. It is not enough
merely to point to the fact that hedge fund activism might benefit tar-
get firms. Nor is Congress's intent from the 1960s dispositive regard-
ing the role hedge funds should play in corporate governance today.
The important question is what legal rule would maximize the net
benefit to society as a whole. Society is better off when outside
blockholders reduce managerial slack and agency costs-but only
when doing so does not come at the expense of long-term value crea-
tion. Society is worse off when trading on asymmetric information
engenders distrust in capital markets and violates the autonomy of
parties who are less informed. Any policy solution must take into ac-
count these costs and benefits.
Private ordering is the best solution to finding an optimal balance.
No party has a better incentive to reduce managerial slack and en-
hance long-term value than a firm's shareholders. Allowing firms to
opt-out of immediate disclosure through a shareholders' amendment
to the bylaws puts the power in shareholders' hands to allow the level
of delayed disclosure optimal for each firm. But we also cannot ig-
nore the social cost of trading on asymmetric information. The SEC
should impose a delayed disclosure fee that would reflect the harm
suffered by society when hedge funds profit from the non-disclosure
of material, nonpublic information regarding share accumulation and
control intent. A compensation fund would soften the blow of trading
while a better informed trading counterparty exploited a legally sanc-
tioned delayed disclosure window.
The approach suggested by this Article has implications for other
areas of securities law as well. Too often policymakers have imposed
a suboptimal mandatory rule instead of balancing costs and benefits
and considering empowerment approaches such as opt-out, taxing,
cannot unequivocally distinguish these cases from cases where the loss is truly caused by delayed
disclosure.
258. As noted previously, deontological harm simply may not be compensable.
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and compensation. Insider trading is a prime example. With so many
resources spent on enforcing an absolute ban,259 We should at least
consider the alternatives. A private ordering approach coupled with a
tax on insiders' profits and compensation for victims could enhance
price accuracy while ameliorating the injury to trading counterparties.
Regulators might even reconsider mandatory rules entirely, as trans-
actional bargaining could facilitate even greater efficiency.2 60
For blockholder disclosure, a private ordering solution is the place
to start. As financial innovation makes acquiring equity ownership
faster than ever, ten days of deceptive trading may induce substantial
instability among target firms and a detrimental focus on short-term
results. Numerous accounting scandals over the years have shown the
cost of ascribing too much weight to quarterly earning reports. For
society as a whole, the day may come when ten days of legally sanc-
tioned exploitation of information asymmetries would impose too
great of a price on participation in the capital markets for many retail
investors.
On the other hand, eliminating the disclosure window entirely may
very well drive away those investors who Jonathan Macey correctly
called "the last bidders who still may be able to make money in the
market for corporate control." 26 1 In the face of empirical evidence
that hedge fund activism may benefit target firms, we should ask our-
selves whether removing this financial incentive is the right approach.
The truth may not always be in the middle,26 2 but when it comes to
blockholder disclosure, the optimal solution requires a careful
balance.
259. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, In Brief FY 2013 Congressional Justifi-
cation 51, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secfyl3congbudgjust.pdf (FY 2012 estimated ex-
penses for the Division of Enforcement total $467,317,000 and request for FY 2013 is
$512,854,000).
260. See generally Brams & Mitts, supra note 178 (advocating bargaining mechanisms for
blockholder disclosure and more generally).
261. Jonathan Macey, Uncle Sam and the Hostile Takeover, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2011, at A.
17, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870 4 60850 4 57 62 08 90 0 10 9 3 1 52 0 0 .
html.
262. See ROBERT J. GULA, NONSENSE: A HANDBOOK OF LOGICAL FALLACIES 102 (2002)
(discussing the false mean fallacy).
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VI. APPENDIx: A SIMPLE MODEL AND CHALLENGES OF
STATISTICAL INFERENCE
A central thesis of this Article is that both the costs and benefits of
delayed blockholder disclosure must be considered when setting regu-
latory policy. There is no a priori justification for concluding that ten
days promotes an optimal level of hedge fund activism for target firms
and society at large. Conceptually, the optimal disclosure window x is
the length of time that incentivizes the level of hedge fund activism
with the aggregate marginal benefit from monitoring management
equal to its aggregate marginal cost, which consists of the sum of the
firm-specific costs of short-termism plus the economic and non-eco-
nomic social costs of delayed disclosure. It is helpful to consider this
equation algebraically:
bi(x) = the total benefit to firm i from blockholder disclosure duration
x
ci(x) = the total cost to firm i from blockholder disclosure duration x
n = the number of firms subject to the Exchange Act reporting
requirements
B(x) = bl(x) + b2(x) +... + bn(x)
C(x) = c1(x) + c2(X) + . . . + C(X)S(x) = the total cost to society from blockholder disclosure duration x.
The optimal aggregate duration x would then be given by:
(1) B'(x) = C'(x) + S'(x)
where f'(x) = f(x).
The problem, of course, is that bi(x), ci(x), and S(x) are unknown.
There is no predefined mathematical function giving the exact costs
and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure. Moreover, while it
might be possible to use surveys and experimental techniques to dis-
cover the firm-specific benefits, costs, and social cost of delayed
blockholder disclosure at different durations, problems of estimation
remain. Consider the following general form of a parametric model to
estimate the coefficients for the correlation between different dura-
tions of delayed disclosure and the corresponding costs and benefits:
(2) B = mB(pB, X, C= )
C = mc(fic, X, e C)
S = ms(s, X, E s)
where B = observed aggregate firm-specific benefits,
C = observed aggregate firm-specific costs,
S observed social costs,
m = a parametric model of the data,
P = parameters to be estimated by m,
X = different delayed durations,
e random error terms
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In theory, once the parameters f3, Pc, and Ps are estimated, the
functions B(x), C(x), or S(x) could be approximated and the optimal
value of x estimated by equation (1). However, it may be difficult to
find an appropriate functional form for the models mB, mc and ms to
fit the distribution of B, C, and S. For example, as discussed above,
the social cost of delayed disclosure may "jump up" at various levels.
Individual firm costs and benefits, e.g., bi(x) and ci(x), may be wildly
unpredictable, e.g., if certain firms would experience an extraordina-
rily high cost for short disclosure while others might derive great ben-
efit from hedge fund activism. In this case, the random errors e 3, G C,
and E s would not necessarily be normally distributed. Hypothesis
testing based on traditional assumptions of normality of the errors
would be inconsistent. More fundamentally, estimating confidence in-
tervals is extremely challenging without an accurate population
model.
Put differently, the optimal disclosure length for individual firms
may be so unpredictable that it may be impracticable to identify an
ideal universal mandatory duration. This suggests that the right ap-
proach to reforming the blockholder disclosure window is to adopt a
legal rule that encourages each firm i to find the optimal disclosure
length x, for itself, taking into account the social cost of such a dura-
tion. Indeed, even if a mandatory duration could be estimated statisti-
cally, it is still likely to be inferior to a private ordering solution that
induces an optimal duration for each firm. A single duration would
necessarily be over- and under-inclusive, compared to a firm-specific
approach. In algebraic terms, the optimal firm-specific duration x; for
firm i is given by:
(3) b',(x) = c';(x;) + SA'(x)
where SA,(x;) = the proportional total social cost of delayed dis-
closure attributable to firm i from delayed blockholder disclosure
with duration xi.
Equation (3) brings us one step closer to a concrete policy proposal
to reforming the section 13(d) blockholder disclosure window. The
ideal rule should encourage the discovery of x; by equalizing each
firm's marginal benefit and marginal cost functions from delayed
blockholder disclosure plus the marginal proportional social cost of
such a delay x; attributable to firm i. Moreover, it is essential to con-
sider the population distribution of B, C, and S. In particular, if S is
nonlinear, internalizing the social cost of delayed blockholder disclo-
sure would require a more sophisticated approach than simply impos-
ing a flat fee on delayed disclosure. This is discussed further in
Section IV.C.
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